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2 MONTH DELAY IN EXAMINING 
BLACKBERRY AFTER ARREST OK
R. v. Giles et al., 2007 BCSC 1147
Police arrested an accused in his vehicle 
for possession of cocaine for the purpose 
of trafficking, searched the vehicle 
incidental to arrest, and seized a 
BlackBerry from beside his driver’s seat. Fifty days 
later the police submitted the BlackBerry to the 
Technological Crime Branch (TCB) in Ottawa for 
examination. They wanted it examined to see what was 
saved on it, such as score sheets, phone numbers, 
E-mail addresses, account numbers, etc. The primary 
examination of the device occurred two months after 
it was seized on arrest. This resulted in the recovery 
of 164 e-mails exchanged between the co-accuseds 
which were stored or “residing” on the BlackBerry’s 
memory.  
During a voir dire in British Columbia Supreme Court, 
the accused argued the police breached his s.8 
Charter right when they searched the BlackBerry 
without a warrant. In his view, the common law power 
of searching incident to arrest did not apply to the 
warrantless extraction and examination of the 
contents of the BlackBerry because it was feasible for 
police to obtain prior judicial authorization by way of 
a search warrant. He submitted, in part, that the time 
and distance from the arrest to the search conducted 
by persons not involved with the arrest rendered it 
outside the scope of a search incident to arrest. 
Justice MacKenzie, however, ruled the examination of 
the BlackBerry some two months after its seizure was 
proper. He stated:
The law is settled that a warrantless search of a 
vehicle may be a valid search incidental to arrest if 
it is conducted for a valid purpose, such as to 
discover evidence of the offence, and if there is 
subjectively some reason related to the arrest for 
conducting the search when it was carried out and 
the reason was objectively reasonable.
I disagree with defence counsel that the police 
exceeded the scope of the common law power to 
search incidental to arrest when they searched the 
BlackBerry and retrieved its 164 e-mails.  The 
seizure of the BlackBerry device itself was 
meaningless without the ability to examine its 
contents.   Having lawfully arrested [the accused] 
for drug trafficking, the police were authorized to 
search him and his immediate surroundings, in this 
case his vehicle … and, since the justification for 
the search was to find evidence, the police could 
seize items on which there was some reasonable 
prospect of securing evidence of the offence for 
which the accused was being arrested. 
Here, [the accused] was lawfully arrested on 
grounds that he had just been involved in a very 
substantial cocaine transaction. The seizure, the 
examination of the contents of his BlackBerry, and 
the retrieval of the e-mails was truly incidental to 
arrest.  According to the report of the TCB analysis 
team, the police were looking for evidence of “score 
sheets”, telephone numbers, e-mail addresses, 
memos, calendar information, saved digital 
communications, PIN numbers, bank account 
numbers and passwords still residing within the 
device memory.  The term “score sheets” refer to a 
form of accounting used to keep track of drug 
purchases, orders and accounts receivable.  All 
these items, for which the investigators had 
directed the TCB to search, were clearly reasonably 
connected to the arrest for a serious drug offence.  
These are not items which have nothing to do with 
the offence of large scale drug trafficking.
The search was akin to looking inside a logbook, 
diary, or notebook found in the same 
circumstances.  The BlackBerry device was 
meaningless without its contents.  There was a 
reasonable basis for doing what the analysts did at 
the request of the police.  I also observe that most 
of the 164 e-mails the Crown seeks to tender (cont’d)
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In evidence were from [the date of the arrest]. A few 
were from the day before.
Also, the analysis and search ... occurred within a 
reasonable time after the arrest in the 
circumstances.  The police had to send the BlackBerry 
from Kelowna to the TCB in Ottawa for 
examination.  Neither the two months between the 
arrest and analysis, nor the distance were 
unreasonable in the circumstances. For example, 
reasonable requirements of time and distance for the 
forensic analysis of blood on clothing seized in a 
search incident to arrest, for DNA information is 
routine. Once an item is seized for use in a criminal 
investigation, the police are entitled to subject it to 
technical analysis to determine its evidentiary 
significance.  This often requires sending the item 
“off-site” to qualified experts. Neither the time nor 
the distance between the arrest and the analysis 
mean that the search of the BlackBerry fell outside 
the scope of the common law power to search 
incidental to this lawful arrest. [references omitted, 
paras. 54-57]
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
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e-LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
“Thanks for working to 
keep us current; I 
always get something 
useful out of every issue.” - Police 
Constable, British Columbia
*********
“I have been using your news letter for 
the past two years to keep up to date with 
legal developments. I receive it from one 
of the other Sgt's and I then discuss the case laws at 
our platoon briefings....Thanks.” - Police Sergeant, 
New Brunswick
*********
“I have just been introduced to your 
publication and found there is a wealth of 
information in it.  I would be very pleased 
to be added to your online mailing list.” - Canada 
Border Services Officer
”*********
“I read your recent Newsletter and found 
it interesting and informative. Could you 
please add me to your mailing list for 
future newsletters.” Conservation Supervisor, 
Department of Natural Resources, New Brunswick
www.10-8.ca
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IN-SERVICE LEGAL ROAD TEST
The “In Service” Legal 
Road Test is a simple 
multiple choice quiz 
designed to challenge your 
understanding of the law. 
Each question is based on a case featured in this issue. 
See page 45 for the answers.
1. The police are allowed to persuade a detainee to 
break their right to silence by legitimate means.
 (a) True
 (b) False
2. A person cannot rebut the presumption of care or 
control found in s.258(1) of the Criminal Code by 
establishing, on a balance of probabilities, they did 




3. Failing to tell a person why they are being detained 




4. The phrase “finds committing”, as it pertains to 
effecting a citizen’s arrest, generally does not relate 
to situations where the person being arrested is 
discovered in the very act of committing an offence.
 (a) True
 (b) False
5. When seeking to admit evidence of a DNA sample 
voluntarily provided by a suspect, the Crown must 
prove waiver beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 (a) True
 (b) False
6. A single incident of threatening conduct can found a 
conviction for criminal harassment.
    (a) True
 (b) False
7. Observations made by a police officer during traffic 
stop procedures can be used in court for both 
establishing reasonable grounds as well as evidence 
of impairment.
    (a) True
 (b) False
“Your publication is very informative.  
Keep up the great work.” - RCMP 
Constable, Nova Scotia 
*********
“I was introduced to the 10-8 In service 
newsletter today for the first time. I 
read it through, especially the case law, 
and found it extremely informative and helpful.” - 
Police Detective, Ontario
*********
“I am a regular reader of your newsletter 
and would like to be included on the 
mailing list for it. I find that it is a great 
resource for keeping up on current case law, which is 
important for this line of work.” - Police Detective, 
New Brunswick
*********
“A recently-arrived former "E" Division 
member recommended your newsletter, 
which I just finished reading. Very 
impressive!  Please add me to your e-mail list.” - RCMP 
Corporal, Ontario
*********
“A colleague of mine gave me a copy of 
your newsletter and I was very 
impressed. ... thanks and keep up the 
great work.” - RCMP Constable, Saskatchewan
*********
“I was emailed a copy of the 10-8 
newsletter from a co-worker, and would 
be most appreciative if you could add me 
to your email list. I found it to be incredibly interesting 
and informative. As an Auxiliary Constable with 
aspirations in furthering my career in law enforcement 
this is a wonderful learning tool.” - RCMP Auxiliary 
Constable, British Columbia 
*********
“A colleague recently e-mailed me the 
Nov/Dec 07 issue of 10-8, and I found it 
quite informative; particularly in the 
realm of case law.“ - Police Officer, Alberta
*********
“Outstanding job, as always. I learn 
something, usually more than one thing, 
every time I read your newsletter.” - 
Police Constable, British Columbia 
“*********
Love the newsletter - great job on it.” - 
Police Officer, Ontario
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PROBATION INVALID WHEN 
CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES 
EXCEED 24 MONTHS
R. v. Yetman, 2008 NLCA 6
The accused pled guilty in 
Newfoundland Provincial Court to 
assault with a weapon and breach of 
recognizance. He was sentenced to 12 
months in prison and placed on probation for three 
years following his release. Later that same day he 
pled guilty before a different Newfoundland 
Provincial Court judge to aggravated assault and 
was handed an 18 month sentence consecutive to 
the earlier 12 month sentence. 
The Crown appealed the sentence to the 
Newfoundland Court of Appeal arguing the 
probation order became invalid. Chief Justice Wells 
agreed:
Section 731 of the Criminal Code permits a 
probation order to be made where a court decides 
to suspend the passing of sentence, or to be made 
in addition to fining or sentencing to imprisonment 
for a term not exceeding two years.  This Court 
has previously determined…that the combined 
effect of section 731 of the Criminal Code and 
subsection 139(1) of the Corrections and 
Conditional Releases Act…[i]n a circumstance 
where a second sentence is imposed, while an 
earlier sentence imposed upon the offender 
remains unexpired, the two are to be treated as 
one sentence which commenced on the date that 
the first sentence was imposed and ends on the 
date that the last sentence to be served would 
expire in the ordinary course”.   Where that 
unexpired “one sentence” exceeds two years, a 
probation order may not be imposed, and any 
probation order that may have been properly 
imposed, in respect of any prior sentence that is 
a component part of the “one sentence”, becomes 
invalid. [references omitted, para. 2]
In this case, the deemed one sentence resulting 
from the combined sentences exceeded 24 months 
rendering the probation order, although valid when 
it was made, invalid. The probation order was set 
aside. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
EMERGENCY SEARCH OF HOME 
LAWFUL
R. v. Wu, 2008 BCCA 7
At about 8:00 a.m. police received a 
telephone call from a pay phone at a 
mall reporting that there was an 
injured person at a residence owned by 
the accused.  A police officer went to the mall to 
investigate whether the call was a hoax but nothing 
useful was discovered. Police attended the house and 
examined its perimeter.  There were no signs of 
forced entry but condensation on the windows and a 
hydro meter spinning at a high rate of speed was 
noted. A computer check revealed the residence was 
a possible marijuana grow operation.   The exterior 
examination indicated the possibility of a marijuana 
grow operation and two separate suites in the house.
Officers knocked on the front door but received no 
answer.  An officer heard what he believed was 
someone exiting the house at the back of the 
premises and when it was checked it out the accused 
was found standing at the back near the bottom of a 
staircase.  He was promptly detained in handcuffs, 
searched, and questioned by police. When asked on 
more than one occasion whether there was someone 
injured at the house the accused responded in the 
affirmative. The police took him to the rear door and 
requested he ask the occupant of the premises to let 
them in.  The door was opened by the accused’s 
girlfriend from inside the residence and   police 
entered and checked the rooms on the main floor.  
From the time of the initial telephone call to the 
time of entry was about a half hour.  
While in the house police discovered two women and 
a child and noted a strong smell of marijuana. A door 
leading to the downstairs portion of the house that 
had a combination padlock on it was forced open and 
a marijuana grow operation was discovered.  The 
accused and his girlfriend were arrested and 
transported to police headquarters.  A search 
warrant was subsequently obtained for the 
sophisticated grow operation.  
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court the 
accused was charged with producing marijuana and 
possession for the purpose of trafficking. He argued 
www.10-8.ca
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that the initial search of the premises was 
warrantless and therefore a breach of his Charter 
rights.  
The trial judge found the police had received what 
was believed to be a 911 call. They tried to locate the 
caller to determine the nature of the caller’s 
concern, but were unable to do so. They then 
attended the home to investigate. The accused 
confirmed that someone in the house was injured and 
a complete search of the house by 
police was inevitable. Although 
these efforts took some time, it 
did not detract from the necessity 
for the police to enter the house 
and search all of it.  The trial judge 
was satisfied that the police were 
motivated by the need to ensure 
that no one in the house needed 
assistance, rather than their 
conclusion respecting the 
likelihood of finding a marijuana 
grow operation. 
“The reluctance of the occupants 
to respond to the police presence, 
[the accused’s] sudden appearance at the rear of the 
house, his confirmation that someone inside needed 
help, and his assertion that the occupants were 
frightened, increased the concerns of the officers”, 
said the trial judge.  The trial judge held that the 
accused’s Charter rights were not breached and the 
evidence was admissible. He was convicted and given 
a nine-month conditional sentence order and the 
residence where the drugs were found was ordered 
forfeited. 
The accused appealed to the British Columbia Court 
of Appeal again arguing, among other things, that the 
search was a Charter violation. He submitted that 
the type of phone call that precipitated police 
attendance to his house has, on occasion, been found 
to be a ruse and the police should have been more 
alive to this.  He contended the trial judge should 
have found the police were suspicious of the call’s 
bona fides, since they visited the mall to check it out. 
The real reason for the entry and initial search, he 
submitted, was related to suspicions of a marijuana 
grow operation and was not a search for a person 
needing assistance.
Justice Hall, in authoring the Court’s unanimous 
judgment, first noted that a warrantless search is 
prima facie unreasonable and that an individual 
enjoys a high expectation of privacy in their 
residence.  However, a police search may be 
permitted in possible emergency situations, which 
are essentially fact driven cases. In upholding the 
trial judge’s conclusion that the initial entry into the 
house was not motivated by suspicions of a marijuana 
grow operation, but was rather to ascertain whether 
someone in the house needed 
assistance and thus lawful, Justice 
Hall stated:
It seems appropriate to observe 
that, on occasion, premises where 
marijuana grow operations exist 
have been scenes of violence and 
injury. The police officers attending 
at the house would be entitled to 
take account of such circumstances 
in assessing the likelihood or 
possibility that there could be an 
injured person inside this house who 
needed assistance. I consider there 
was a sufficient evidentiary basis 
for the judge to conclude, as she 
did, that the police were motivated by safety 
concerns at the time they made their 
warrantless entry into this house. I would not 
disturb her factual finding on this issue.
When the police entered the premises, they 
simply made a cursory search of the premises 
to make certain that no one was injured or 
needed police assistance.  When they had 
satisfied themselves as to this, they left the 
premises and obtained a search warrant before 
conducting a full investigation of the basement 
area where the marijuana was being grown. In 
my view, the police did not go beyond what was 
necessary and appropriate in their initial search 
of the house. Their conduct was justifiable 
having regard to all the circumstances.  [paras. 
16-17]
The accused’s conviction appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
Note-able Quote
“Jumping at several small opportunities may get us 
there more quickly than waiting for one big one to 
come along” - Hugh Allen
“It seems appropriate to observe 
that, on occasion, premises where 
marijuana grow operations exist 
have been scenes of violence and 
injury. The police officers 
attending at the house would be 
entitled to take account of such 
circumstances in assessing the 
likelihood or possibility that there 
could be an injured person inside 
this house who needed 
assistance.” 
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SEARCH GOING BEYOND 
AUTHORIZING PROVISIONS 
UNREASONABLE
R. v. Dreyer, 2008 BCCA 89
Two police officers stopped a car 
driving with its tail lights off.  The 
accused was in the front passenger seat 
while his sister was driving. Their 
father was the registered owner of the car, and the 
sister was listed as the principal driver. The police 
looked in the car and saw an opened 1.2 litre bottle 
of beer on the floor behind the driver's seat, an 
offence under s.44 of British Columbia’s Liquor 
Control and Licensing Act (LCLA). The accused and 
his sister were told to get out of the car and stand 
behind it while it was searched under s.67 of the 
LCLA, which allows police to search any person and 
anywhere, except a residence, when there are 
reasonable and probable grounds to believe that 
liquor is, anywhere or on anyone, unlawfully possessed 
or kept, or possessed or kept for unlawful purposes.
The officer conducted a thorough search, including 
looking under the windshield visors.  He saw a 
crumpled brown paper bag in the space between the 
driver's seat and centre console.  He moved the bag 
to look for liquor beneath it and in doing so, felt 
objects in the bag which suggested drug flaps.  He 
opened the bag and found four packages of cocaine, 
each containing half a gram.  The occupants were 
arrested for possession of a controlled substance 
and a search of the car for drugs was 
carried out.  Under the front passenger 
seat, the officer found a plastic Ziploc bag 
which contained two paper packages of 
cocaine, also one-half gram each.
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court 
the accused argued the drugs found during the liquor 
search were inadmissible because the police 
breached s.8 of the Charter. The officer testified 
he knew there was no liquor in the paper bag but was 
suspicious of its contents. And he did not think he 
had grounds to arrest before he opened it. In feeling 
the paper bag to get an idea of what was inside, the 
officer said he was trying to ascertain if there was 
something there that was going to be evidence or an 
officer safety risk, or whether it was just garbage. 
The trial judge, however, rejected the accused’s 
arguments. In his view, the search of the bag was not 
unreasonable. “When the officer reached into the 
area between the driver's seat and the centre 
console, that was a reasonable part of his search as 
he had found liquor in such an area on prior occasions 
and … it seems like a reasonable place to look for 
liquor in circumstances such as this,” said the judge. 
When he found the bag it was also reasonable for him 
to pick it up and move it, thereby feeling what he 
suspected was illegal drugs—given his previous 
experience and training. Although he may not have 
felt he had sufficient grounds to make an arrest, he 
nonetheless had reason to open this bag and look 
inside it. And even if there was a Charter violation, 
the trial judge would have ruled the evidence 
admissible. As a result, the accused was convicted of 
possessing cocaine for the purpose of trafficking. 
The accused then appealed to the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal arguing, among other things, that 
the search was unreasonable, breached his s.8 
Charter rights, and the evidence was inadmissible. 
The three member panel hearing the appeal 
unanimously agreed. Justice Donald, delivering the 
opinion of the Court, ruled the trial judge erred in 
holding  the LCLA authorized the search. 
The Search
Justice Donald ruled the police could not rely on the 
search provisions of the LCLA when the officer 
looked in the bag knowing it did not contain liquor nor 
could he rely on officer safety reasons:  
A search without legal authority 
is an unreasonable search within 
the meaning of section 8.  A 
search for liquor was in this case 
authorized by section 67(2) of 
the Liquor Control and Licensing 
Act, by reason of the open beer 
bottle. But the Act does not authorize a blanket 
search.  The officer turned up the drugs knowing 
full well that the bag contained no alcohol.
As mentioned, the officer testified that he was 
motivated by safety concerns in opening the 
bag.  Safety can be a valid purpose for a search 
incidental to arrest….  But here the [accused] 
was detained outside the car at the time of the 
search, and in the circumstances it is hard to 
imagine any hazard to the officers or the public. 
………
“A search without legal 
authority is an unreasonable 
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If in the course of a liquor search illicit drugs 
come into plain view, seizure can be valid.  This 
is not such a case.  What the judge has 
permitted is an expansion of a search 
authorized for a limited purpose to a general 
search for contraband on a hunch.  He has 
allowed the police to rummage for whatever 
might look suspicious, regardless of the 
authorized limits of the search.   This is a 
serious error in law.   [references omitted, 
paras. 18-21]
Thus, the Appeal Court found the police exceeded 
the scope of what the LCLA search powers 
authorized. 
Admissibility
The Appeal Court also found the trial judge erred in 
his s.24(2) analysis, which was improperly skewed by 
his earlier findings. Although the evidence was non-
conscriptive and would not affect trial fairness, the 
Charter breach was serious. In noting that the 
officer offered an unsupportable safety reason for 
opening the bag, Justice Donald stated:
[The breach] represents a deliberate abuse of a 
limited power to search, and the officer showed 
bad faith in trying to justify it on a spurious claim 
of safety. Such an abuse cannot be shrugged off 
as merely trivial; it must be condemned by a 
decision to exclude the evidence, so that the 
Charter will be seen to matter in actual cases and 
not just in theory. The reputation of justice will 
be harmed by allowing this improperly obtained 
evidence to lead to a conviction. [para. 27]
He ruled the police conducted a search under a 
limited auspices for liquor and intruded on the 
accused’s privacy interest in his property to find 
something the officer knew could not have been 
liquor and could not have threatened the safety of 
the police or the public. The integrity of the justice 
system requires the police respect the privacy of a 
motor vehicle occupant’s personal effects. In 
signalling the importance of this right and 
discouraging overzealous searches, Justice Donald 
excluded the evidence. 
As a consequence, the accused’s conviction was set 
aside and an acquittal was entered. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
s.10(a) BREACH RESULTS IN 
STATEMENT EXCLUSION
R. v. Nguyen, 2008 ONCA 49
Police executed a Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act search warrant to 
search a house, but found it to be 
unoccupied. A sizeable marijuana grow 
operation was located in the basement. As an officer 
left the house to change into a protective suit in 
preparation of dismantling the grow operation, he 
saw a van driven by the accused pull into the 
driveway. The accused, a Vietnamese immigrant, 
briefly stopped his van and then began to leave the 
driveway in reverse. The officer was wearing a vest 
with the word “Police” in large white letters, 
approached the van, stated “Police, stop”, and asked 
the accused if he lived there. He said he did. He was 
then arrested for production and possession of 
marijuana and advised him of his right to counsel. 
At trial in the Ontario Court of Justice, the Crown 
relied almost exclusively on the accused’s answers to 
the officer connecting him to the grow operation, 
thereby establishing knowledge and control of it. The 
officer testified he believed he could detain the 
accused at common law, but did not immediately 
advise him of his s. 10(b) Charter rights because it 
would not make sense to extend the detention if the 
accused was unconnected to the residence. The trial 
judge ruled that the accused was detained when the 
police officer told him to “stop” and his Charter 
rights under s. 10 had been violated. However, the 
trial judge admitted the evidence under s.24(2) and 
convicted the accused of producing marijuana and 
sentenced him to five months imprisonment.
The accused then successfully appealed to the 
Ontario Court of Appeal arguing the trial judge erred 
in failing to exclude his statement. The Crown did not 
contest that the officer failed to comply with s.10(a) 
of the Charter, which requires that a detainee be 
advised of the reasons for arrest or detention 
“promptly”, or that there was any impediment to the 
officer’s ability to quickly inform the accused of the 
reason for stopping him before asking him any 
questions concerning the residence.  
In this case, the police had executed a search 
warrant and were in the process of investigating a 
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grow-op. The accused was the subject of an 
investigative detention and his questioning was in the 
context of a heightened degree of criminal jeopardy, 
which demanded that particular attention be paid to 
the informational component of s.10(a). Section 10(a) 
enshrines a detainee with the right to be informed 
of the reasons for detention. This information is 
important with respect to two aspects; (1) a person 
is not obliged to submit to an arrest if he does not 
know the reason for it and (2) its adjunct to the right 
to counsel conferred by 
s.10(b) of the Charter (a 
person can only exercise 
their s. 10(b) right in a 
meaningful way if they know 
the extent of their 
jeopardy). Providing reasons 
is really part of the detaining 
or arresting process itself  
and does not need to be 
expressed in technical or 
precise language, but must 
inform the person as to the 
reason why the restraint is 
being imposed. The word “promptly”, found in s.10(a) 
means immediately, as opposed to “without delay”, 
found in s.10(b), which does not necessarily convey 
the notion of immediacy. Here, it would have been 
simple for the arresting officer to provide the 
accused with the information that led to his 
detention. The officer could easily have said “Police, 
stop, we’re investigating a marijuana grow op in this 
house.” 
The Crown submitted, however, that the breach of 
the accused’s s.10(a) rights was so minor that the 
evidence of the oral statement should not to be 
excluded. The Court responded:
Once detained, an individual is at the mercy of state 
actors. Thus, in circumstances where the 
informational component of s. 10(a) of the Charter is 
easy to fulfill – as it was in this case – the breach of 
the obligation to provide that information cannot be 
considered a trivial matter. We say this because, as 
the jurisprudence illustrates, the right against self-
incrimination is fundamental to the spirit of s. 10 of 
the Charter. 
It is conceded that the [accused’s] s.10(a) right was 
violated in this case. The violation of that right gave 
rise to the very evidence that resulted in the 
accused’s conviction. Had the information required 
by s.10(a) been conveyed to the [accused], he may not 
have answered the police officer’s questions, and the 
police thus may not have obtained the evidence relied 
on by the Crown to obtain the [accused’s] conviction. 
[paras. 21-22] 
In determining the admissibility of unconstitutionally 
obtained evidence pursuant to s. 24(2) of the 
Charter a court must apply a threefold test; (1) 
would the admission of evidence affect the fairness 
of the trial, (2) the seriousness of the constitutional 
misconduct, and (3) the effect on the administration 
of justice.
The accused’s oral statement made to 
police in response to questioning was 
conscriptive evidence, which would 
generally tend to render a trial unfair 
if admitted. He was compelled as a 
result of a Charter breach to 
participate in the creation or discovery 
of self-incriminating evidence. And 
there was nothing to mitigate this trial 
unfairness. He was given no advice 
about his right to counsel or about why 
he was being detained. Nor was there 
anything about the officer’s initial 
question that suggested answering could give rise to 
criminal jeopardy. The accused had no basis for 
making an informed choice about whether or not to 
answer the officer’s question. And his statement did 
not bear the hallmarks of reliability associated with 
real evidence. Nor did the officer in this case think 
he had not detained the accused. Instead, he 
specifically ordered the accused to stop. Even if the 
officer did not intentionally breach the accused’s 
s.10(a) rights, they were engaged and could easily 
have been respected.
As a result, the question posed by the officer, “Do 
you live here?”, compromised the accused’s right 
against self-incrimination. Because he answered in 
the affirmative, a conviction followed. In the Ontario 
Court of Appeal’s view, the admission of the oral 
statement rendered the trial unfair. Thus, failing to 
exclude the statement would bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute. The 
accused’s conviction was set aside. However, since 
the arresting officer found a key to the residence on 
the accused’s person, which was other evidence 
capable of connecting him to the grow operation, a 
new trial was ordered. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
“Once detained, an individual is at 
the mercy of state actors. Thus, in 
circumstances where the 
informational component of s.10(a) 
of the Charter is easy to fulfill – as it 
was in this case – the breach of the 
obligation to provide that information 
cannot be considered a trivial matter 
... [b]ecause ... the right against self-
incrimination is fundamental to the 
spirit of s.10 of the Charter.” 
www.10-8.ca
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GUN PARTS MUST BE AVAILABLE 
AT ROBBERY SCENE
R. v. Smith, 2008 ONCA 151
The accused was charged with numerous 
robbery, disguise, and weapons 
offences in the Ontario Superior Court 
of Justice. Although a gun entered into 
evidence did not have a breech bolt, an expert 
testified that it was easy to insert a breech bolt and 
thereby make the gun operable.  He also testified 
that breech bolts could be readily obtained and said 
he made a phone call to a store and could have a 
breech bolt shipped in a matter of days at a cost of 
$40. As well, there was no need for a permit for such 
a purchase. There was, however, no evidence that a 
breech bolt was available during the robberies. The 
accused was nonetheless convicted of 24 offences 
and was sentenced to 8 years in custody in addition 
to 5 years of pre-trial custody. 
He appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal 
submitting that the gun had no breech bolt and it was 
therefore not operable and not capable of being 
fired. In his view, the trial judge erred in 
determining the gun used was a “firearm” as defined 
in s. 2 of the Criminal Code.  
The Ontario Court of Appeal agreed. In R. v. Covin
(1983) the Supreme Court of Canada explained that 
an inoperable gun will still be a firearm if parts are 
available on scene during the commission of the 
offence that could render the gun capable of firing 
and causing serious injury. In this case, however, 
there was no evidence that parts were available “on 
the scene”. Therefore, the trial judge erred in 
finding that the rifle in question was a “firearm” 
within the meaning of the Criminal Code.
Nor did the Appeal Court accept the Crown’s 
alternative argument that the rifle could have been 
fired by striking a nail against the cartridge. There 
was no evidence that a nail and something suitable to 
strike it with were available on the scene. Three 
convictions of robbery with a firearm were quashed 
and convictions for robbery with an imitation firearm 
were substituted while two convictions for pointing a 
firearm were quashed and acquittals entered.   
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Firearm Phrases
Breech Bolt—a mechanism which opens 
and closes the breech in a firearm, such 
as a rifle, machine gun, etc.; designed to 
push a cartridge into the chamber by 
sliding action.
‘FINDS COMMITTING’ 
TRIGGERED BY DETECTION OF 
CRIME IN PROGRESS
R. v. Abel & Corbett, 2008 BCCA 54
In response to learning of a break in at 
a neighbour’s house, the accused Abel 
searched his own home and discovered 
that a rifle he had hidden was 
missing.  Through making his own enquiries in the 
area, Abel learned that Mr. Holl, a man with a serious 
drug problem and a long record for property crimes, 
offered to sell a local drug dealer the rifle. After 
the rifle was not returned, Abel decided to take 
action to retrieve it.  Along with Corbett (armed with 
a tire iron) and another man (armed with a wooden 
bat), Abel went to a townhouse where it was believed 
that Holl was staying. A physical altercation occurred 
between the men and  Corbett hit Holl with the tire 
iron.  Holl was overpowered, restrained using zap 
straps, and directed the men to a dental office 
where the rifle, which was hidden under a wheelchair 
ramp, was recovered. Holl was then taken to the 
police station where he was turned over because 
Abel believed there was an outstanding warrant for 
his arrest. 
When police learned what had happened and 
investigated the matter,  the men were charged with 
break and enter (s.348(1)(a)), assault with weapons 
(s.267(a)), unlawful confinement (s.279(1.1)(b)), and 
possession of weapons for a purpose dangerous to 
the public peace (s.88(1)). At trial in British Columbia 
Supreme Court the men submitted that the concept 
of citizen’s arrest should be left with the jury for 
the purposes of considering whether their actions 
were justified.  Since possession is a continuing 
activity, and constructive possession constitutes 
possession in law, they argued Holl was “found 
committing” the offence of possessing stolen 
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property at the townhouse and they 
were therefore entitled to arrest him 
under s.494(1)(a). The Crown, on the 
other hand, contended that possession 
could not be given such a broad meaning 
in the context of a citizen’s arrest. 
The trial judge agreed with the Crown 
and ruled that the meaning of “finds 
committing” under s.494 was not 
available in the circumstances of the case. Rather, 
the section requires immediacy and an arrest based 
upon personal observation, which did not occur here. 
The jury was instructed that the men were not 
entitled to arrest Holl and any such arrest would be 
unlawful. Abel was convicted of being unlawfully in a 
dwelling house and assault, Corbett of possession of 
a dangerous weapon, and the third man was acquitted 
of all charges. 
The accuseds then appealed to the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal arguing, in part, that a citizen’s 
arrest for the offence of possessing stolen property 
is lawful even when the person being arrested does 
not possess the stolen property at the time and place 
of the arrest. In their view, the “finds committing” 
requirement in s. 494(1)(a) applies to a person who is 
in constructive possession of a stolen item. 
Section 494 of the Criminal Code allows any one to 
arrest without a warrant a person they find 
committing an indictable offence. Possession as 
defined under s.4(3) includes a person knowingly 
having anything in any place, whether or not that 
place belongs to or is occupied by them, for their or 
another’s use or benefit. Under this concept, a 
person who exercises some measure of control over 
an item can be “in possession” of the item even 
though it is not in their personal possession. Both 
theft of a rifle and  possession of it knowing it was 
stolen are indictable offences. 
The accuseds suggested that Holl retained 
possession of the stolen rifle regardless of where it 
was located.   As such, they argued that when they 
encountered Holl at the townhouse he was “in 
possession” of the rifle and therefore was “found 
committing” the indictable offence of possessing 
stolen property.  Thus, in their view, they were 
authorized to arrest him under s.494(1)(a) and their 
lack of information regarding the whereabouts of 
the rifle was irrelevant.
Justice Frankel, writing the 
opinion of the Court, disagreed 
with this interpretation of 
“finds committing”. He 
examined the common law roots 
and historical statutory usage 
of the “finds committing” 
expression and ruled “it 
connotes a situation where the 
arresting party comes upon someone in the very act 
of committing an offence.  In other words, criminal 
activity must be taking place in the presence of the 
arresting party.”  He found this opinion was further 
supported by the French version of other federal 
statutes that authorize arrest on the basis of “finds 
committing.” He stated:
From the beginning, Canadian courts have 
interpreted the words “finds committing” as 
pertaining to situations where the person being 
arrested is discovered in the very act of 
committing an offence… [para. 45] 
Most importantly, in my view, the Supreme Court 
of Canada has interpreted the power to arrest on 
the basis of “finds committing” as one which is 
triggered by the detection of a crime in progress.  
[para. 51] 
In the context of a citizen’s arrest under s. 
494(1)(a) of the Code, this means that before a 
citizen can effect an arrest, he or she must have 
reasonable grounds to believe that the person to 
be arrested is apparently in the process of 
committing an indictable offence in his or her 
presence. [para. 52]
And further:
Parliament clearly intended the words “finds 
committing” to have the same meaning whenever 
used in authorizing an arrest without warrant.  It 
is, therefore, appropriate to construe the English 
version of the Code having regard to how this 
power has been expressed in French in these 
other enactments.
The French version of “finds committing” in the 
more recent enactments is “qu’il prend (qu’ils 
prennent) en flagrant délit d’infraction”, meaning 
“to be caught in the act” or “caught red-handed.”  
In other words, the detection of a crime in 
progress.
To the extent that the expressions “finds 
committing” and “qu’il trouve en train de 
“From the beginning, Canadian 
courts have interpreted the words 
‘finds committing’ as pertaining to 
situations where the person 
being arrested is discovered in 




Volume 8 Issue 2
March/April 2008
commettre” used in the Criminal Code may be 
ambiguous, which I do not think they are, any 
ambiguity is resolved by having regard to how 
Parliament has expressed itself in French in these 
other statutes.  The interpretation common to all 
versions in both official languages, i.e., their 
shared meaning, is that the person effecting the 
arrest must have come upon someone who, at that 
very moment and at that very place, is engaged in 
criminal activity. [paras. 61-63]
As a result, Justice Frankel found that the accuseds 
had no information as to where the rifle might be nor 
did they come upon Holl in possession of it, even 
though they reasonably believed he had stolen it.  
They therefore could not justify their actions on the 
basis that Holl was “found committing” the offence 
of possessing stolen property at the townhouse. The 
accuseds appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
STATEMENT ADMISSIBLE 
DESPITE WISH TO EXERCISE 
RIGHT TO SILENCE
 R. v. Borkowsky, 2008 MBCA 2
A 17 year old complainant reported she 
had been sexually assaulted by her 66 
year old supervisor at a gravel pit. The 
incidents included the touching of her 
breasts and vaginal area, kissing, 
oral sex and intercourse.  Police 
arrested the accused and 
interviewed him for about an hour, 
which was recorded on video and 
audio tape. He informed the police 
on nine occasions that he had been 
advised by his lawyer not to make 
a statement (remain silent) and 
wished to do so, but they 
continued to question him anyway. 
He eventually made a statement, which was primarily 
exculpatory, but he did confirm his presence at the 
gravel pit. 
 
Following a voir dire in the Manitoba Court of 
Queen’s Bench, the trial judge held that the 
accused’s statement to police was voluntary and did 
not infringe his right to silence.  She stated:
In the circumstances before this Court, I do not 
believe that [the accused] was deprived of his 
operating mind nor was his will overborne.  [The 
officer’s] questioning was purposeful, but was in 
no way oppressive.  The police are permitted to 
endeavour to persuade an accused or suspect to 
break his or her assertion of the right to silence 
by legitimate means.  It is only where there is an 
abuse of that persuasion will a suspect’s right to 
silence under s. 7 be said to be breached.  In this 
case, I find that [the accused] was not deprived 
of his right to remain silent.  He chose to respond 
after being persuaded to answer [the officer’s] 
questions.
Although the Crown chose not to tender the 
statement as evidence, they reserved the right to 
use it in cross-examination should the accused 
testify, which he did not. Therefore, his statement 
was never used. He was convicted and sentenced to 
three years’ imprisonment.
The accused appealed to the Manitoba Court of 
Appeal arguing, among other grounds, that his right 
to silence had been infringed. He submitted that he 
might have testified if the statement had not been 
available to the Crown for the limited purposes of 
cross-examination. Therefore,  the outcome of the 
trial may have been different. 
Justice Steel, authoring the unanimous decision for 
the Manitoba Court of Appeal, found it was not a 
violation of s.7 of the Charter 
for a police officer to continue 
to question a detained person 
who has asserted a right to 
remain silent. Citing the recent 
Supreme Court of Canada 
decision of R. v. Singh (2007), 
which rejected the notion that 
a suspect’s assertion of the 
right to silence requires police 
to stop questioning, Justice 
Steel noted the longstanding 
rule that entitles police to continue questioning so 
long as their conduct does not reach the point where 
the suspect’s will is overborne, which would render a 
statement involuntary. As for this case, he stated:
[T]he accused was appropriately charged and 
cautioned on two separate occasions. He was 
interviewed by police after he was permitted to 
“The police are permitted to endeavour 
to persuade an accused or suspect to 
break his or her assertion of the right 
to silence by legitimate means. It is 
only where there is an abuse of that 
persuasion will a suspect’s right to 
silence under s.7 be said to be 
breached.”
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speak with his lawyer.  The accused indicated to 
the interviewing officer that he had been 
instructed by his counsel not to make a statement 
or speak to the police.  
The interviewing officer employed a technique 
similar to the one used by the officer in Singh – 
setting out the facts known to the police and the 
allegation made by the complainant, then asking 
for the accused’s version of events.  The 
interviewing officer also spoke with the accused 
about matters unrelated to the charge, after 
which the accused began discussing the 
allegations with the officer.
As in Singh, the statement eventually made by the 
accused was not a confession, though it confirmed 
his presence with the complainant at the gravel 
pit.  As such, the statement was primarily 
exculpatory.  However, unlike Singh, the accused’s 
statement was only admitted for the limited 
purpose of cross-examination if the accused 
testified.  As the accused chose not to testify, 
the statement was never received as evidence.  In 
Singh, Singh’s statement was admitted as 
evidence and considered by the trial judge. 
[paras. 40-42]
And further:
In such cases, deciding whether the trial judge 
erred will be a factual determination based on 
the evidence adduced. If I compare the factual 
circumstances in this case with the Singh case, 
the persistent questioning in Singh was much 
worse, yet the court held that Singh was not 
deprived of the right to choose nor was his 
operating mind affected.  
The transcript of the questioning in this case 
reveals a similar situation.  The videotaped 
statement, which was reviewed by the trial 
judge, took approximately one hour.  The trial 
judge had the opportunity to determine 
voluntariness by having the opportunity to 
observe the form and contents of the statement 
as well as the demeanour of the accused. In her 
reasons, she reviewed the manner of the 
questioning, the accused’s response and his 
demeanour, as well as the duration of the 
questioning and the amount of time the accused 
was housed in cells before providing his 
statement. She concluded [there was no reason 
to suspect the voluntariness of the accused’s 
statement, no evidence provided of an improper 
threat or promise, oppression, nor was there any 
overt police trickery, that he had an operating 
mind, and that no inducements were offered 
sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt that his 
will had been overborne].
With respect to the right to silence, the accused 
raised on nine occasions during the course of his 
interview by the police the fact that he had 
received the advice of counsel to remain silent 
and wished to rely upon it.   It was argued by 
counsel that on each of those occasions, the 
police officer skilfully engaged in a conversation 
with the accused where he would repeatedly 
return to certain relevant issues intermingled 
with discussion concerning matters such as 
striking a deer, bears, construction, gravel and 
moral issues. In doing so, he effectively overcame 
the accused’s assertion of his right to remain 
silent.
Given the trial judge’s conclusion on the issue of 
voluntariness, her conclusion as to the right to 
silence is not surprising. She correctly identified 
that the issue to consider was whether in this 
case the questioning went too far and, in essence, 
deprived the accused of an operating mind and 
the ability to make a meaningful choice whether 
to speak.  Applying that test to the facts at hand, 
she concluded [the accused was not deprived of 
his right to remain silent, but rather he chose to 
respond after being persuaded to answer the 
officer’s questions]. [paras. 44-47]
 
The trial judge correctly stated and applied the law 
to the facts of the case.  The accused’s appeal was 
dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
 
DRIVER’s CONDUCT WAS NOT 
SPONTANEOUS or REFLEXIVE 
WHEN FLEEING POLICE
R. v. Chiasson, 2008 ONCA 90               
The accused was driving his mother’s 
car when he was signalled by a police car 
to stop.  Although he saw the signal, he 
continued driving for some distance 
before finally stopping in a residential driveway. The 
police officer approached the car, held the accused’s 
shoulders through the open car window, and told him 
that he was under arrest. The accused put the car 
into gear and applied the accelerator, knocking the 
officer to the ground.  The car ran over the officer’s 
leg and caused non-permanent ligament injuries.  The 
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accused parked the car a short distance away and 
fled into a marshy area.  He was subsequently 
apprehended, but only after failing to respond to an 
order to put his hands in the air, resisting arrest, and 
attempting to grab a gun from an arresting officer’s 
holster. 
At trial in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice the 
accused was convicted of several offences, including 
dangerous driving causing bodily harm. The trial 
judge concluded the accused’s conduct was 
intentional. He was sentenced to eighteen months in 
jail, three years probation, and given a five-year 
driving prohibition and a three-year weapons 
prohibition. 
The accused appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal 
arguing, among other things, that the trial judge 
erred in holding his conduct of putting the car in gear 
and pressing the accelerator when he knew the police 
officer’s arm was in the car was not a panicked reflex 
reaction to his apprehension.  The Appeal Court, 
however, found no error:
In concluding that the [accused’s] conduct was 
intentional, the trial judge considered the 
[accused’s] conduct in the context that the 
[accused] acknowledged his initial failure to stop 
for the officer, he knew when he did stop that 
the officer was approaching his car to speak with 
him, he knew the officer’s arm was in the car and 
he knew that he was under arrest.  In these 
circumstances, the [accused’s] response in 
accelerating the car could not be said to be 
either spontaneous or reflexive.  Rather, it was a 
considered response taken to avoid arrest.  
The accused’s appeal from dangerous driving was 
dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
WAITING FOR TOW TRUCK AN 
OK DELAY IN ASD CASE
R. v. Ritson, 2008 BCPC 26
Police stopped the accused shortly 
after midnight for speeding. The 
officer smelled alcohol on the accused's 
breath and she admitted drinking.  She 
failed a roadside screening test giving the officer 
grounds to make a breathalyzer demand. The 
breathalyzer demand was given along with a 24 hour 
driving prohibition. The officer called for a tow truck 
and waited for its arrival or for another officer to 
wait with it. From the time of the demand until the 
investigating officer left the scene with the accused 
was 24 minutes. She subsequently provided two 
breath samples over the legal limit and was charged 
with impaired driving and driving over 80mg%.
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court the 
accused argued that it was not reasonable for the 
officer to await the arrival of the tow truck or the 
other officer before taking the accused to the police 
station for the breathalyser test. The wait, the 
accused submitted, caused an unreasonable delay in 
the taking of the breath samples. Therefore, the 
breath samples were not taken as soon as practicable 
as required by legislation. The Crown, on the other 
hand, contended that the delay should be considered 
from when the accused was placed in the police 
vehicle, rather than when the demand was made.  As 
well, another officer was called to attend to wait for 
the tow truck, which reduced the delay. The Crown 
submitted that the wait was part of police work 
directly related to the investigation and was 
reasonable in the circumstances.  
Judge Baird Allen agreed with the Crown and found 
the delay in this case was not unreasonable. Although 
the onus was on the Crown to account for the delay, 
which was 24 minutes, the officer said he was 
awaiting the arrival of the tow truck or another 
officer to watch the car. Even though the officer's 
evidence did not establish that the vehicle was towed 
under the Motor Vehicle Act, which in Judge Baird 
Allen's view was intended to authorize the towing of 
a vehicle to prevent the commission of an offence 
where a driver is served at roadside with a 
prohibition, and is not arrested, the calling of the 
tow truck in these circumstances and the wait for 
the arrival of the second officer was reasonable. She 
also noted that standard police policy to have 
vehicles towed when the driver and sole occupant is 
arrested for impaired driving, could, by itself, be 
sufficient reason for towing, such that a consequent 
delay would not be unreasonable. Here though, the 
officer took the additional step of getting another 
officer to attend so that less delay was occasioned. 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca
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DANGER AN ESSENTIAL 
ELEMENT IN CARE & CONTROL 
OFFENCE
R. v. Mallery, 2008 NBCA 18
A police officer located the accused's 
truck parked in the parking lot of a local 
bar about 20 minutes after receiving a 
call from an a motorist who had been cut 
off by it. The officer parked his vehicle some 150 to 
200 feet from the accused's vehicle to complete 
some paperwork when, a few minutes later, he heard 
the truck being started. The vehicle's lights were on 
and the accused was behind the wheel. But within 
seconds, the accused turned the ignition and lights 
off, got out of the vehicle and headed back towards 
the bar entrance. The accused stopped after the 
officer got out of his vehicle and ordered him to do 
so. He was arrested for "care or control" and 
subsequently charged with over 80mg% contrary to 
s. 253(b) of the Criminal Code after providing breath 
samples over the legal limit.
At trial in New Brunswick Provincial Court the 
accused testified that he made arrangements for 
the bartender to take him home. However, while in 
the bar another patron informed him that the lights 
to his truck had been left on so he went outside and 
started his vehicle to see whether the battery was 
dead and whether the lights would go out. When the 
engine turned over, he turned off the lights and the 
ignition, got out of his truck, and headed back to the 
bar. He did not know he was being watched by police 
and just as he was about to enter the bar, he was 
arrested. The trial judge found the accused was in 
his vehicle for only a "brief moment" and accepted 
his evidence that he did not intend to drive, thereby 
rebutting presumptive care or control. The judge 
also concluded the accused was not in actual care or 
control because his interaction with the vehicle did 
not pose a risk of danger to the public. 
The Crown appealed and the New Brunswick Court of 
Queen's Bench found the trial judge erred, set aside 
the acquittal and ordered a new trial. The accused 
then appealed to the New Brunswick Court of Appeal 
arguing the appeal judge erred by not finding 
"danger" an essential component to care and control. 
The Crown, on the other hand, submitted that a 
sufficient interaction test only requires the accused 
perform sufficient acts with the vehicle's fittings or 
equipment and that danger is not an essential 
element. Thus, in the Crown's view, once the accused 
started the truck the offence was complete.
After reviewing the applicable case law, Justice 
Robertson, writing the opinion of the New Brunswick 
Court of Appeal, concluded that care or control does 
require a finding of danger as an essential component 
of the offence. As Justice Robertson noted, "The 
concept of danger provides a unifying thread which 
promotes certainty in the law while balancing the 
rights of an accused with the objectives of the 
legislation." He wrote:
If danger is not already an essential element of 
the offence, it should be, with one exception. In 
cases where the Crown invokes the statutory 
presumption and the accused is unable to rebut it, 
the accused is deemed to have care or control of 
the vehicle pursuant to s. 258(1)(a) of the Criminal 
Code. Hence, there is no need to embark on a 
danger inquiry. This leads us to identify valid 
policy reasons for accepting that danger is 
otherwise an essential element of the offence. I 
begin with the proposition that such an element is 
consistent with the purpose and objectives of the 
legislation. The provisions of the Criminal Code 
dealing with impaired driving have as their 
immediate objective the elimination of harm to 
the public. Section 253 makes it an offence to 
operate a vehicle (drive) when one's ability to do 
so is impaired by alcohol or, if the vehicle is not in 
motion, to have care or control of it. This 
provision empowers police officers to detain and 
arrest those who pose an immediate or potential 
threat to public safety. Those caught driving 
while impaired represent the immediate threat. 
Those who have care or control represent a 
potential threat or risk of harm. The elimination 
of danger or risk of harm is central to the 
objectives of the legislation. Hence, one would 
assume that if a person's interaction with his or 
her vehicle did not pose an immediate or potential 
risk of harm or risk to public safety, a conviction 
under s. 253 would not fall within the objectives 
of the legislation. In other words, courts should 
not be convicting those who do not represent this 
threat. Legally, it makes no sense to eliminate 
danger as an essential component of the offence 
and to insist that a conviction can rest on the 
extent of the accused's interaction with the 
vehicle's fittings or equipment (the "sufficient 
interaction" test). Intuitively, every lay person 
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knows that someone sitting drunk behind the 
wheel of car, with the motor running, has care or 
control of the vehicle, but it falls to the legally 
trained to explain why in criminal law the concept 
of care or control involves more.
It is easier to defend the position that danger 
should be an essential element of the offence by 
attacking the validity of the sufficient-
interaction test for assessing care or control. It 
seems draconian in the age of the Charter to hold 
that a person may be convicted of having care or 
control of a vehicle while impaired, even though 
the accused had no intention of putting the 
vehicle in motion and the facts do not otherwise 
support a finding of risk to public safety. To hold 
that neither the intent to drive nor the presence 
of danger is an essential element of the offence 
is to risk the criticism that the offence bears too 
close a resemblance to an absolute liability 
offence. Admittedly, the mens rea for the 
offence persists (the intent to assume care or 
control after the voluntary consumption of 
alcohol), but the notion that the accused cannot 
speak to his or her presence in a vehicle while in a 
state of inebriation is arguably inconsistent with 
fundamental principles of criminal law. Indeed the 
whole purpose of having the statutory 
presumption set out in s. 258(1)(a) of the Criminal 
Code is to protect the public interest without 
exposing an accused to an absolute liability 
offence. [paras. 46-47]
And further:
Accepting that danger is an essential element of 
the offence of having care or control of a vehicle, 
it is still incumbent on this Court to apply the 
proper analytical framework to determine 
whether the trial judge erred in acquitting the 
[accused]. My understanding of the law is as 
follows. In care or control cases, the ultimate task 
of the trial judge is to decide whether the Crown 
has met the burden of establishing beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the accused's interaction 
with his or her vehicle presented a danger or, as 
it is sometimes phrased, a "risk of danger" or a 
"risk to public safety". If the facts establish 
beyond a reasonable doubt a risk of the accused 
putting the vehicle in motion, either intentionally 
or unintentionally, or if the facts otherwise 
support a finding of danger (such as from parking 
one's car in the middle of a public thoroughfare), 
then care or control will have been established. 
Obviously, this is a general framework. While an 
intention to drive (to put the vehicle in motion) is 
not an essential element of the offence, if proven 
a conviction may follow. In that regard, the Crown 
has the option of invoking the presumption set out 
in s. 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code. If it is 
established that the accused occupied the 
driver's seat, the onus falls on the accused to 
show that, on a balance of probabilities, it was not 
for the purpose of setting the vehicle in motion. 
An accused who fails to rebut the presumption will 
be deemed to have had care or control of the 
vehicle and, subject to any other defences, a 
conviction will follow. Moreover, the failure to 
rebut the presumption has the legal effect of 
dispensing with the need to conduct a danger 
inquiry. If, however, the accused rebuts the 
presumption, the Crown is still entitled to 
establish "actual" care or control by proving that 
there was a risk of putting the vehicle in motion 
unintentionally or of posing in some other manner 
an immediate danger to public safety. In applying 
this general framework, the trial judge must have 
regard to all of the surrounding circumstances 
leading up to the intervention, typically by the 
police. Above all else, it is impermissible for the 
trial judge to isolate certain facts and to deem 
those facts sufficient for purposes of 
establishing a risk to public safety. One final 
point. With respect to the "sleeping it off" cases, 
the "change-of-mind" and "firm-plan" arguments 
are sometimes advanced and considered when 
dealing with the question whether the statutory 
presumption has been rebutted. In other cases, 
the trial judge may deal with those arguments 
after first ruling that the accused rebutted the 
presumption of an intention to drive. Either way, 
the result should be the same. [references 
omitted, para. 52]
Section 253(b) of the Criminal Code creates an 
offence for a person to have care or control of a 
motor vehicle, whether or not it is in motion, when 
their blood-alcohol level exceeds the statutory limit 
(80mg%). Care or control can be established in two 
ways; presumptive care or control or actual care or 
control.
Presumptive care or control is set out in s. 258(1)(a) 
of the Criminal Code. It establishes that once the 
Crown proves, on a balance of probabilities, that a 
person occupied the driver's seat of a motor vehicle, 
that person is deemed to have care or control of the 
vehicle unless the person establishes that they did 
not occupy the seat for the purpose of setting the 
vehicle in motion. In other words, a person can rebut 
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the presumption of care or control under s. 258(1)(a) 
by establishing on a "balance of probabilities"—not 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt—that they did not 
have the intention to drive. If the accused is unable 
to rebut the statutory presumption with respect to 
the intention to drive, the accused is deemed to have 
had care or control and danger is presumed.
Actual care or control is not concerned with a 
person's intent but rather with whether their 
interaction with the vehicle posed a "danger", or a 
"risk of danger" or a "risk to public safety". A person 
can still be convicted of care or control without an 
intent to drive if the Crown adduces evidence that 
the person performed acts indicative of care or 
control of the vehicle, so as to create a "danger". The 
Crown must establish a risk of the accused putting 
the vehicle in motion, either intentionally or 
unintentionally, or the facts must otherwise support 
a finding of danger (e.g. from parking one's vehicle in 
the middle of a public thoroughfare). It is not 
enough, however, to merely show the accused 
started the engine. The fact that a person was found 
inebriated, or with a blood-alcohol level exceeding 
the statutory limit, in the front seat, with the motor 
running is not necessary determinative of whether 
the person is in care or control. Each case must 
instead, be decided on its own facts. For example, 
some accused have been acquitted of care or control 
offences by asserting they were sleeping-it-off. 
Justice Robertson described these types of cases as 
follows:
The typical sleeping-it-off case is one in which the 
police find the accused inebriated and sleeping 
behind the wheel of his vehicle. ... Sometimes the 
motor is running and sometimes it is not. 
Invariably, the accused is able to rebut the 
statutory presumption by persuading the trial 
judge that he did not occupy the driver's seat for 
the purpose of putting the vehicle in motion 
(driving). He simply wanted to sleep it off. If at 
the time the police intervened the motor was 
running, the accused will maintain that it was for 
the purpose of generating necessary warmth (the 
vehicle as "bedroom and heater" defence). 
The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal found the appeal 
court erred and the acquittal was reinstated. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
REASONABLE SUSPICION MUST 
BE THAT DRIVER HAS ALCOHOL 
IN BODY
R. v. Troung, 2008 BCPC 73
Police pulled the accused over for 
slowing down but not stopping at a stop 
sign. An officer went to the passenger 
side of the car and shone his flashlight 
in the car, noting the accused had glassy, glossy, and 
watery eyes. A second officer, who went to the 
driver's side, detected an odour of liquor and told his 
partner this. The officer then decided to administer 
a roadside screening test and gave a demand, but the 
accused refused. He was subsequently charged with 
refusing to provide a sample.
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court the 
officer who gave the demand stated he formed a 
reasonable suspicion to do so because of the 
accused's eyes and the evidence of his partner who 
had informed him of an odour of liquor. Section 
254(2) of the Criminal Code allows a police officer to 
demand a roadside breath sample using an approved 
screening device where they reasonably suspect that 
a person who is operating a motor vehicle has alcohol 
in their body. 
 
As Judge Kitchen noted, "The key is that the officer 
making the demand have a reasonable suspicion as to 
the existence of alcohol in the body of the person 
being investigated." However, in this case the judge 
concluded the officer making the demand did not 
have the requisite grounds to make it and therefore 
it was not valid. He stated:
I find the approved screening device demand was 
made on the basis of glassy eyes and an odour of 
liquor from somewhere. I am not satisfied that 
formed the basis for a reasonable suspicion the 
accused had alcohol in his body as required by 
s.254(2) of the Code.  
The charge was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca
Note-able Quote
“Science may never come up with a better 
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probable grounds for her suspicion. As for her 
objective grounds, the officer testified that her 
grounds for demanding a sample of breath were 
based on the following:
• the odour of alcohol;
• her knowledge that it was approximately the 
time for the bars to be closing;
• the accused did not stop when she activated 
the emergency lights on her police vehicle;
• the accused swerved to the left when the 
emergency siren was activated;
• the accused appeared flustered;
• he leaned heavily on the door when he exited 
the pick-up truck; and
• he stumbled after stepping out of the pick-
up truck.
 
The accused contended, however, that the officer 
failed to take into consideration other observations 
suggesting his ability was not affected by alcohol 
consumption such as he was not slurring his speech, 
his balance was steady except when he left the 
vehicle, his fine motor coordination was 
unremarkable when he produced his driver's licence 
and insurance, and his driving was unremarkable 
except when he swerved after the police siren was 
activated.  
Judge Rodgers, however, noted "the smell of alcohol 
on a driver's breath is sufficient for an investigating 
police officer to form the suspicion necessary to 
demand that the driver provide a sample of breath 
into an approved screening device." In this case, the 
officer detected an odour of alcohol coming from the 
accused's breath, which was sufficient to allow the 
officer to demand a breath sample. In addition, the 
officer had made other observations, such as the 
accused's driving, his initial difficulties in 
maintaining his balance, and the officer's knowledge 
that it was approximately time for the bars to be 
closing.  These observations, along with the smell of 
alcohol, gave the officer reasonable and probable 
grounds to demand the breath sample. Observations 
that might lead to a conclusion the accused was not 
impaired were considered by the officer; but she 
nonetheless had sufficient grounds to form her 
suspicion. Judge Rodgers concluded the officer had 
reasonable and probable grounds, objectively 
measured, to form the suspicion necessary to 
ODOUR OF LIQUOR ON DRIVER’s 
BREATH SUFFICIENT FOR ASD 
DEMAND
R. v. Wheeler, 2008 BCPC 37
A police officer observed a pick-up truck 
stopped at an intersection at 3:20 am 
without taillights. The vehicle turned 
left without signalling and the officer 
followed, activating the police emergency lights. The 
truck did not stop but continued for about one block. 
When the officer sounded the police siren the truck 
suddenly swerved to the left, then turned right 
where it came to a stop.
The officer approached the accused and told him he 
was stopped because his vehicle did not have 
functioning taillights. She asked him to provide his 
driver's licence and vehicle insurance, which he did 
without difficulty. As the officer spoke to the 
accused she observed he was somewhat flustered 
and noted an odour of alcohol coming from him as he 
spoke. The officer directed the accused to step out 
of his truck and saw him lean heavily on the doorpost 
and then stumble a couple of steps as he left the 
vehicle.  His balance was unsteady and the officer 
again detected an odour of alcohol coming from his 
breath.
The officer knew the accused had been operating a 
motor vehicle and formed the suspicion he had 
alcohol in his body. She demanded he provide a 
sample of his breath for analysis using an approved 
screening device. He was subsequently charged with 
impaired driving and over 80mg%. 
 
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court the 
accused argued the investigating officer lacked the 
grounds necessary to demand a roadside breath 
sample, thereby breaching his s.8 Charter rights. As 
well, he submitted that the officer violated s.10(a) 
of the Charter because she failed to tell him of the 
reason for the detention.
In order for a police officer to demand a driver 
provide a sample of breath for analysis by an 
approved screening device the officer must have 
reasonable and probable grounds, objectively 
measured. In this case, Judge Rodgers found the 
officer subjectively believed she had reasonable and 
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demand a sample of breath for analysis in the 
approved screening device.
As for whether the accused's rights under s.10(a) of 
the Charter were breached because the officer 
failed to advise him that he was under investigation 
for impaired driving rather than simply operating a 
vehicle without functioning tail lights, it could be 
inferred from the circumstances that he understood 
the basis for his detention. It was not necessary for 
the police to specifically inform the accused of the 
reasons for detention. Judge Rodgers concluded 
"that the circumstances were such that [the 
accused] must have understood the reason for his 
detention was that he was suspected of impaired 
driving and the police were pursuing an investigation 
based on that suspicion." There was no Charter 
violation and even if there was, it was trivial and 
inconsequential and the evidence was admissible 
under s.24(2).  
The accused's application to exclude evidence was 
dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca
NO REALISTIC OPPORTUNITY TO 
CONSULT COUNSEL BETWEEN 
TIME OF  PULL OVER & ASD TEST
R. v. Johnson, 2008 BCPC 41
A police officer responded to a report 
of a possible impaired driver.  He 
noticed a vehicle matching the 
description going past him on a highway 
and followed it for a couple of kilometres. The 
vehicle did not exceed the speed limit at any point, 
but weaved several times back and forth within the 
slow lane, where it stayed the whole time.  
The officer stopped the accused and asked him for 
his driver's licence and his 
insurance papers. He told 
him he had a report of a 
possible impaired driver 
matching the vehicle's 
description. While having 
this conversation the 
officer noticed the accused 
would lean away from him 
and talk towards the 
vehicle with his face turned away, rather than facing 
him directly.  The officer found this unusual and also 
noticed a very strong odour of mouthwash, some 
slurred words, and glazed and watery eyes. When 
asked if he had anything to drink, the accused said 
"no".  And when asked a few more times the accused 
confirmed he had nothing to drink.
The officer asked the accused to step out of the 
vehicle. His purpose was to determine if the odour of 
mouthwash was coming from the accused or from 
someone else in the vehicle.  The accused's balance 
was quite good but when asked again how much he had 
to drink he admitted he had one beer about 15 
minutes earlier. The officer formed a reasonable 
suspicion that the accused had alcohol in his body and 
he was asked to sit in the front seat of the police 
vehicle for the purposes of taking a breath test on 
the approved screening device (ASD). From the time 
of the stop until he was asked to sit in the police car 
was 10 minutes. About five minutes later the officer 
read the screening device demand and the accused 
failed the test. 
 
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court the 
accused argued that the roadside breath sample was 
not taken forthwith and the right to counsel and the 
opportunity to contact counsel should have been 
given. In his view, s.254(2) of the Criminal Code
requires the breath demand be made forthwith and 
the passage of time between the pull over and the 
breath demand, some 15 minutes, was  excessive. The 
right to counsel, he submitted, should have been 
provided.
The Crown, on the other hand, submitted s.10(b) was 
not violated because the word "forthwith" is 
dependent upon what is going on during the period of 
time leading up to the formation of the reasonable 
suspicion and the making of the demand. The Crown 
contented the time between the formation of the 
reasonable suspicion and the 
making of the demand was brief. 
 
"Forthwith" means "within a 
reasonable time having regard to 
the provision and circumstances 
of the case" and an ASD sample 
should "generally be administered 
as quickly as possible" allowing 
for such delay as necessary to 
“[The passage of time from the pull over  
to the administration of the ASD test]  was 
fully and properly occupied with the 
investigation, forming the suspicion, 
readying the device and instructing the 
accused.  There was simply no time in 
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ready the equipment and instruct the suspect on 
what to do. The cases on the meaning of forthwith do 
not involve a calculation of the precise number of 
minutes but examine the passage of time in the 
context of what occurred. Only when the police 
officer is not in a position to 
require that a breath sample 
be provided forthwith, does 
the officer need to advise a 
driver about their right to 
counsel. And even if a 
cellular phone was available 
at the roadside, it is 
irrelevant if the officer is in 
a position to administer the ASD test forthwith.  
Individuals who can afford and choose to use cellular 
telephones do not have broader constitutional rights 
than those that don't. 
In this case, the judge noted that part of the time 
taken up between asking the accused to step into the 
police vehicle for the breath sample and the taking 
of the breath sample itself was preparing the 
instrument and describing what the device was used 
for, the possible results (pass, warn or fail), the 
consequences associated with each result, and the 
accused pleading with the officer to cut him a break.  
In holding the sample was taken forthwith and the 
accused was not entitled to speak to a lawyer Judge 
Frame stated:
[The officer] formed a reasonable suspicion at 
approximately 9:40 pm that [the accused] had 
alcohol in his body.  Up to that point, there was a 
reasonable period of investigation to determine if 
there was reasonable suspicion.  The appropriate 
measure of time to consult counsel does not 
commence until a reasonable suspicion has been 
formed that the accused has alcohol in his body.  
[The officer] indicated to [the accused] that he 
required him to step into his police vehicle so he 
could administer a breath test as a result of that 
suspicion.  [The accused] complied but occupied 
much of the time following the formation of that 
suspicion with a plea for leniency.   [The officer] 
also occupied some of that time with explaining 
the workings of the AS Device.  In my view the 
conversation which ensued between the formation 
of the reasonable suspicion and the issuance of 
the formal demand at 9:45 pm was a delay of five 
minutes and was no longer than reasonably 
necessary to enable the police officer to carry out 
his duties.  Those duties included instructing [the 
accused] to get into the police vehicle and 
instructing him on how the breath test would 
proceed.  
Even if the breath demand was made informally at 
9:40 pm when [the officer] advised 
[the accused] that he required him to 
get into his vehicle for the purposes 
of taking a breath test, then the 
seven minutes which followed before 
administering the breath test did not 
afford a realistic opportunity to 
consult with counsel given that the 
time was filled with [the accused] 
seeking a break and [the officer] 
advising [him] how the breath test would proceed.  
This is not a case of [the officer] wasting time 
with irrelevant matters or delay being incurred 
because of the lack of availability of an ASD in 
[the officer's] vehicle. The evil which is sought to 
be cured in the various cases put before me is 
simply not present in the case at bar. [paras. 29-30]
And further
In my view, the investigation which ensued at 
roadside between 9:30 pm and 9:40 pm was a 
reasonable amount of time for [the officer] to 
conduct the investigation including his 
conversations with [the accused] about the 
consumption of alcohol and the use of mouthwash.  
To be perfectly clear, the passage of time from 
the pull over at 9:30 pm to the administration of 
the ASD test around 9:47 pm, and the events 
which occurred in that time, did not afford a 
realistic opportunity to consult with counsel.  The 
time was fully and properly occupied with the 
investigation, forming the suspicion, readying the 
device and instructing the accused.  There was 
simply no time in which counsel could have or 
should have been consulted. [references omitted, 
paras. 34-35]
The demand for the accused's breath sample into an 
ASD conformed with the statutory requirements of 
s.254(2) and therefore there was no unreasonable 
search and seizure nor was the accused entitled to 
exercise his right to obtain and instruct counsel 
without delay nor to be informed of that right prior 
to the ASD demand. 
The accused's Charter application was dismissed.
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca
“[T]he conversation ... between the 
formation of the reasonable suspicion 
and the issuance of the formal 
demand ... was no longer than 
reasonably necessary to enable the 
police officer to carry out his duties.” 
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ACCUSED MUST HAVE 
STANDING TO SEEK REMEDY 
R. v. Vi, 2008 BCPC 29
Police received an anonymous tip about 
a potential marihuana grow operation at 
a residence and started an 
investigation. A junior police officer 
made several attendances to the subject residence 
and trespassed on the property. A very senior police 
officer with considerable experience as a drug 
investigator assumed conduct of the file and 
disclosed to the judicial justice of the peace in the 
search warrant application the errors made by the 
junior officer. The experienced affiant officer then 
set out in the information all steps taken, 
independent of any information the junior officer 
may have provided, to support the application for the 
search warrant. The warrant was issued, the home 
searched, and a marihuana grow operation was 
discovered. The accused was arrested at another 
residence and was charged with unlawful production 
of marihuana and possession for the purpose of 
trafficking. 
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court the 
Crown objected to the accused cross-examining the 
affiant officer arguing he had no standing to bring 
such an application. Although the accused purchased 
the home for $130,000 cash and a black pickup truck 
belonging to him was seen in the driveway of the 
home, he did not actually live at, and infrequently 
visited, the subject property.  The black pickup truck 
was registered to the accused at another address 
and his driver's licence also showed this other 
address as his residence. Unnamed neighbours also 
provided information to police about an unidentified 
Asian couple who were associated with the subject 
home but were hardly ever there.
Under s.24(2) a person can only seek a Charter 
remedy if their personal rights have been infringed. 
In search cases, the onus is on the accused to 
establish, on a balance of probabilities, a reasonable 
expectation of privacy and, thereby, standing. In this 
case, Judge Doherty found the accused did not have 
a reasonable expectation of privacy. He was not 
present at the time of the search nor was he a 
found-in. It was not clear that he had possession or 
control of the property, although he had keys to the 
subject property on his person when arrested.  And 
even though he owned the property, it was not clear 
who, if anyone, was occupying it. Nor did he live 
there. The persons associated with the property 
were merely described as an Asian couple and there 
was no indication that the accused was one of those 
people. 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca
IN HOUSE ARREST LAWFUL
R. v. Vi, (ruling #2) 2008 BCPC 28
After executing a search warrant at a 
residence owned by the accused, police 
went to a different house where the 
accused lived at about 9:15 am.  to find 
him and arrest him for the marihuana grow operation. 
They did not find him at his address and arranged 
for a member of the Citizens on Patrol (COP) to keep 
watch. An officer received notice from COP that the 
accused had returned, so he, along with another 
officer, returned to the residence intending to make 
the arrest. They did not have nor give consideration 
to obtaining a Feeney warrant. While explaining why 
police were at his doorstep, the accused invited the 
officer inside. The officer stepped inside the foyer, 
continued to explain why he was there, and arrested 
the accused.  
During a voire dire in British Columbia Provincial 
Court the accused argued that the arrest was 
unlawful, breached the Charter, and was serious 
enough to warrant a remedy. He submitted there 
were no exigent circumstances, police should have 
refused the invitation to enter, informed him of the 
reasons why they were there, and told him of his 
options - to come with them immediately or, if he 
refused, police would obtain a Feeney warrant. He 
further contended that the intention of the police in 
having him step outside the sanctuary of his 
residence for the purpose of arresting him was 
encapsulated by a Feeney warrant. 
Judge Doherty, however, disagreed. By inviting the 
police in, the accused consented to the officers' 
attendance inside. And even if evidence of informed 
consent was not compelling by inference or 
otherwise, the Charter breach was of a technical 
nature only and required no remedy.
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca
www.10-8.ca
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OFFICER LACKED SUFFICIENT 
GROUNDS FOR ASD TEST
R. v. Geraghty, 2008 BCPC 63
The accused was pulled over by police 
during a Christmas roadblock. She 
denied having any alcohol to drink and 
the officer could not smell any, either 
coming from the vehicle, her person, clothing, or from 
her mouth. But the officer noted her eyes appeared 
watery and she displayed slowness and diminished 
dexterity when asked to produce her driver's licence 
and registration. She succeeded only in locating her 
driver's licence. When asked to step out of her 
vehicle and walk to the curb, she appeared to steady 
herself on the door when closing it and her first step 
toward the curb appeared to be a misstep. And when 
asked again at the curb about her drinking, she 
replied she had one drink. The officer formed a 
reasonable suspicion that the accused had alcohol in 
her body when she was driving and made a roadside 
screening demand, which was refused.  
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court on a 
charge of refusing to provide a breath sample, the 
accused argued the officer did not have the 
necessary grounds to form a reasonable suspicion 
that she had alcohol in her body. The Crown, on the 
other hand, submitted that the officer’s 
observations, taken cumulatively, afforded him a 
reasonable basis for suspecting the accused had 
alcohol in her body.  
A demand for a breath sample pursuant to s. 254(2) 
is unlawful if the officer who makes it does not 
reasonably suspect that the person operating a motor 
vehicle "has alcohol in that person's body".  In this 
case, Judge Woods concluded the officer did not, 
considered in the aggregate and context of other 
possible explanations, objectively have a reasonable 
suspicion. There was no reference to an odour of 
alcohol, even though the judge could not say a 
collection of other factors could never form the basis 
for a reasonable inference that there is alcohol in the 
body. Each of the rest of the observations could be 
consistent with the presence of alcohol in the body 
but they could also be consistent with other 
explanations as well, including strain, fatigue, 
infection, and recent weeping causing watery eyes, 
high heels or other precarious footwear on a wet road 
surface causing the misstep, and persons pulled over 
by the police can be anxious through the experience 
itself, causing them to sometimes fumble with 
documents when asked for them and showing 
nervousness. In acquitting the accused, Judge Woods 
stated:
Absent evidence of the odour of alcohol or erratic 
driving or slurred speech or other observations of 
the kind recounted in cases like these, the 
aggregation together of the observations that 
[the officer] did make does not in my mind achieve 
critical mass.  It does not amount to a sufficient 
foundation of concrete observations not otherwise 
explainable to justify [the officer] coming to a 
conclusion that [the accused] had alcohol in her 
body.  
Even [the accused's] admission that she had had 
one drink does not lead inexorably or necessarily 
to the formation of a reasonable conclusion that 
she had alcohol in her body. That drink could have 
been consumed long enough before that even if it 
was an alcoholic drink (which was not specifically 
addressed in the question or the answer) the 
alcohol could have cleared by the time [the 
accused] was pulled aside.
While I do not believe that he acted in anything 
other than good faith, I believe that on the 
slender evidence of the observations he made, 
[the officer] rushed too quickly and in my view 
unreasonably to attribute to what he observed to 
the effects of alcohol.  
It was incumbent on him in these circumstances to 
give genuine consideration to other competing 
explanations as well as the explanation that there 
was alcohol in [the accused's] body before forming 
his suspicions.  This is particularly so when some of 
the touchstone indicia, beginning with the odour of 
alcohol emanating from the accused's mouth and 
including as well erratic driving and slurred 
speech, did not form part of the equation.  
.........
Here, there was no odour of alcohol, nor were 
there other touchstone indicia.  In those 
circumstances, I am satisfied that in order to 
form a reasonable suspicion that there was alcohol 
in [the accused's] body, [the officer] would need 
to have observed more than he did.  Inasmuch as 
the breath demand was not predicated on a 
reasonable suspicion that [the accused] had 
alcohol in her body, it was neither a valid nor a 
lawful demand.  The Code criminalizes refusal to 
comply with lawful demands and because this 
demand was not lawful, I find [the accused] not 
guilty. [references omitted, paras. 32-37]
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca
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COUNSEL OF CHOICE NOT 
BREACHED WHEN OFFICER GAVE 
OPTIONS
R. v. Semple, 2008 BCSC 155
A police officer received a complaint 
about a possible impaired driver at a 
McDonald's drive-thru, spotted the 
suspect vehicle, and followed it. He 
stopped the vehicle, noted a moderate smell of 
alcohol from the vehicle and observed the accused's 
speech was slightly slurred. The officer asked the 
accused to get out of the vehicle and walk to the back 
of it, where he determined the smell of alcohol was 
coming from the accused. The officer made some 
other observations related to balance and he formed 
the grounds necessary for the Approved Screening 
Device (ASD) demand. The accused failed and the 
officer believed his ability to operate a motor vehicle 
was impaired by alcohol. He read the 24 hour 
suspension from driving under the Motor Vehicle Act,
gave the breathalyzer demand, and Chartered the 
accused. 
 
The accused was transported back to the police 
station where he invoked his right to speak with 
counsel by indicating he wanted to speak to a lawyer 
of his choice. The officer called the lawyer's phone 
number, but there was no answer. So he asked the 
accused if he wanted to speak to any other lawyer, if 
he wanted to continue to wait, or if he wanted to 
speak to Legal Aid.  The accused said he wanted to 
speak to Legal Aid. The officer then called Legal Aid, 
left a message, and when they called back the 
accused spoke to duty counsel. Once the call was 
concluded, the accused was taken to the breathalyser 
room where breath samples were taken. 
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court the judge 
found the ASD sample was taken forthwith, as the 
legislation (s.254(2) Criminal Code) required. He held 
there was no gap in time between the formulation of 
the suspicion and the reading of the ASD demand. 
Further, the trial judge found the accused's rights 
under s.10(b) had not been violated. He ruled the 
officer obtained the name of a lawyer from the 
accused, found a phone listing, and called the number. 
There was no answer, the officer told the accused 
this, and then provided three choices: continue to 
wait, call any other lawyer, or call Legal Aid. He chose 
to call Legal Aid and failed to establish a breach on 
his Charter rights. The certificate of analysis was 
admissible and the accused was convicted.
The accused appealed his conviction to the British 
Columbia Supreme Court arguing the trial judge erred 
in failing to find s.8  (ASD sample not taken 
forthwith) and s.10(b) (deprived of counsel; of 
choice) Charter breaches. But Justice McKinnon 
agreed with the trial judge and dismissed the appeal. 
s.8: Unreasonable Search/Seizure
Section 254(2) contains an implicit requirement that 
the ASD demand be made "forthwith" and the burden 
is on the Crown to establish this on a balance of 
probabilities. In this case there was evidence from 
the officer inferring that the demand flowed 
immediately following formation of the suspicion. The 
officer formed his suspicion after the accused got 
out of the truck and walked to the back of it, which 
was followed immediately by the ASD demand.  
Justice McKinnon found the trial judge was entitled 
to conclude there was no delay.
s.10(b): Right to Counsel 
Although the accused was given the opportunity to 
speak with duty counsel, he contended he was 
"foreclosed" from speaking with the lawyer of his 
choice, thus breaching his rights under s.10(b). By 
taking the initiative to call his chosen lawyer, the 
accused submitted that the officer "usurped" the 
accused's right to make his own contact and 
therefore the officer was obligated to make much 
more effort in arranging it.
Justice McKinnon noted that the right to counsel has 
been interpreted to include the right to counsel of 
one's choice. And that's just what the officer did. 
Once the officer made no contact, the initiative to 
contact counsel was then placed back to the accused. 
He stated:
I do not read any of the cited cases to stand for 
the proposition that when police place a call for an 
accused, they then take on the role of "finder" of 
counsel, relieving the accused of any obligation in 
that regard. There may be circumstances where 
police "take charge" and exclude the accused 
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At bar, the police placed the call to [the accused's 
lawyer of choice], got no answer (not surprisingly 
given the time of day), told the [accused] of this 
and invited him to consider other choices [call a 
different lawyer, legal aid, or wait]. The accused 
considered these choices and opted to call Legal 
Aid.  He took the initiative as he was obliged to do. 
[references omitted, paras. 38-39]
The accused's appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
FAILING TO KNOCK AT GARAGE 
DOOR A SERIOUS CHARTER 
BREACH: EVIDENCE EXCLUDED
R. v. Cao, 2008 BCSC 139
Six drug squad members attended at 
the accused's residence for the purpose 
of executing a search warrant 
authorized under the Controlled Drugs 
and Substances Act. Although police had conducted 
surveillance of the house on nine previous occasions 
prior to obtaining the search warrant (where no one 
nor any vehicles were seen), they did not watch the 
place for any length of time prior to their entry nor 
did they carry out a risk assessment.  Police had 
identified no specific risks respecting the two story 
house, other than the concerns generally associated 
with marihuana grow operations, and had no specific 
concern about weapons, had no reason to believe 
anyone was in the home when the warrant was 
executed, and had no concerns about preserving the 
evidence.
Drug squad members approached the front door of 
the house with a battering ram, 
pounded on the front door and called 
out "police-search warrant". They 
abandoned entry by the front door 
and went to the garage door situated 
at the side of the property where 
they forced entry without further 
announcement, and entered with their 
guns drawn. About one to two minutes 
elapsed from the time police knocked 
at the front door and entered 
through the side door. They then 
kicked open the door leading from the 
garage into the house, again with guns 
drawn and without any further knock and 
announcement. Immediately after kicking in the door, 
the officers went into the laundry room where they 
found the accused, screamed commands at him, and 
pointed their guns at his head. He was handcuffed 
and arrested for production of marihuana. Police 
found a 704 plant marihuana grow operation in four 
rooms of the unfinished basement. 
At trial in British Columbia Supreme Court on charges 
of production of and possessing marihuana for the 
purpose of trafficking, the accused argued the 
search warrant was executed in an unreasonable 
manner because the police did not properly announce 
their presence, did not provide a reasonable period of 
time for him to respond, and they entered with their 
guns drawn. In his view, the police summoned him to 
the front door, but abandoned that means of entry 
and entered through the garage door without any 
further announcement, thereby giving him 
insufficient time to react and answer their request. 
He submitted there were no exigent circumstances 
warranting a dynamic entry without proper notice, no 
specific danger associated to the residence, and no 
reason to suspect anyone was inside the house. By 
battering down the door and entering with guns 
drawn, the police aggravated the unreasonable entry. 
Thus, the accused maintained the evidence should be 
excluded under s.24(2). 
The Crown, on the other hand, argued the police 
knocked and announced at the front door and waited 
for about two minutes, enough for the occupants to 
respond. Having received no response, police were 
entitled to presume entry had been denied and force 
their way in. Police must act quickly for their safety 
and the safety of any 
occupants for a number of 
reasons in suspected 
marihuana grow operations. 
It is normal to find weapons 
or traps, there is a risk that 
documentary evidence will 
be destroyed, and waiting 
longer may allow an accused 
to arm themselves or 
escape by another exit. The 
Crown also suggested that 
entry with guns drawn did 
not breach s.8 because the 
police need to protect 
“The lawfulness of an entry to a 
residence pursuant to a valid search 
warrant depends upon the 
reasonableness of the manner of 
entry chosen by the police. Where 
there are no exigent circumstances 
justifying a dynamic entry ... the 
police are required to knock, 
announce their presence and their 
lawful purpose for entry, and allow a 
reasonable amount of time for a 
response by any occupants.”
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themselves from risks that may be present in a grow 
operation and it is reasonable that guns are drawn to 
clear the house. 
Justice Bruce found in favour of the accused and 
ruled that the police violated his s.8 Charter rights. 
She first described the knock and announce rule as 
follows:
The lawfulness of an entry to a residence pursuant 
to a valid search warrant depends upon the 
reasonableness of the manner of entry chosen by 
the police. Where there are no exigent 
circumstances justifying a dynamic entry, as in the 
circumstances of this case, the police are required 
to knock, announce their presence and their lawful 
purpose for entry, and allow a reasonable amount 
of time for a response by any occupants. This so 
called "knock and announce" rule is not a mere 
formality. This rule is necessary to ensure the 
personal safety of anyone inside the residence at 
the time of entry as well as the police. When the 
police batter down a door to secure entry to a 
residence unannounced with firearms drawn and 
ready to be discharged, it creates a high degree 
of risk to both the occupants and the police. This 
risk is substantially reduced when the occupants 
have time to prepare themselves for the entry 
rather than responding instinctively to an unknown 
and possibly dangerous intruder. 
.........
A dynamic entry, where there is no prior 
announcement and request to enter, is only 
justified if there is a real threat of violent 
behaviour associated with the particular residence 
or a demonstrated risk that evidence could be 
destroyed. It is not sufficient to warrant a 
dynamic entry that the police identify the risks 
associated with marihuana grow operations in 
general. ...... [references omitted, paras. 25-27]
In this case there were no exigent circumstances 
warranting a dynamic entry. The police first sought 
entry through the front door, knocked and 
announced, but abandoned that entry point and chose 
to enter through the garage door where no further 
announcement was made before battering it in. 
Instead, they should have knocked and announced at 
the garage door as well. Justice Bruce described it 
this way:
One of the underlying purposes of the "knock and 
announce" rule is to allow any occupants a 
reasonable period of time to permit entry to the 
police. In most cases, one or two minutes would 
clearly be sufficient time for an occupant to 
respond to a demand for entry. In this case, 
however, the police directed the occupant's 
attention to the front door and then surprised him 
by entering through the garage door. Whether or 
not I accept the accused's evidence that he was 
endeavouring to respond to the pounding on the 
front door, the police have to assume that when 
they knock and announce at the front door, that 
will be the door to which the occupants will direct 
their attention. Consequently, if the police 
abandon the front door for another entrance to 
the residence, they must at least knock at the 
second door and give a reasonable period of time 
for the occupant to respond. Absent these 
minimum standards, the entry is in effect a 
dynamic one, which surprises the occupant, 
without any evidence of extrinsic circumstances. 
[para. 31]
Justice Bruce concluded the police violated the 
"knock and announce" rule by failing "to alert the 
occupant to their demand for entry to the garage 
door and failed to provide a reasonable time for 
response before battering the door down and gaining 
entry violently." Furthermore, the s.8 violation was 
aggravated by the police drawing their weapons in the 
ready position when entering:
Underlying the "knock and announce" rule is the 
personal safety of the police and the householder 
who may be placed in jeopardy when there is a 
violent intrusion into a private residence. Because 
there was no formal or informal risk assessment 
supporting the use of drawn weapons in this 
particular case, and no reasonable suspicion that 
anyone was inside the Residence, the abrupt and 
violent entry executed by the police went well 
beyond what was necessary in the circumstances. 
The actions of the police created a real risk of 
harm to an occupant by accidental shooting and to 
the police in terms of an aggressive response to 
the violent entry. In my view, a shocking entry 
without a prior "knock and announce", with guns 
drawn and ready to be discharged, and pointed at 
the accused's head, could have produced 
disastrous consequences. [para. 35]
As a result, Justice Bruce ruled the evidence 
inadmissible under s.24(2).  Although it was non-
conscriptive evidence and trial fairness would not be 
affected, the breaches were serious. She stated:
Turning to the facts of this case, I find the 
violent entry executed by the police was 
unnecessary in all of the circumstances and clearly 
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created a danger for the accused and the police. 
Coupled with the high expectation of privacy 
accorded to persons in their homes, the police 
created an extremely dangerous situation by 
forcing entry without any regard to the particular 
circumstances before them. Moreover, this kind 
of violent and forceful entry with guns drawn 
appears to be standard practice for the Surrey 
R.C.M.P. I note here that neither pre-entry 
surveillance nor a risk assessment to determine 
the amount of force required for a safe entry is 
normal procedure. 
The charges against the accused are serious and, 
if convicted, he could face heavy penalties. 
Further, it is well known that in the Lower 
Mainland the existence of marihuana grow 
operations in private residences is an ever 
increasing problem that in some municipalities has 
become epidemic. As a consequence, society's 
interest in bringing those charged with serious 
offences to justice is a significant factor in this 
case. 
Balancing the relevant factors, I am satisfied the 
evidence should be excluded. Notwithstanding 
production of marihuana is a serious offence and 
the Crown will be unable to prove its case without 
the evidence secured by the entry to the 
Residence, to admit the evidence would bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute. The 
manner of entry employed by the police in this 
case potentially endangered lives without any 
exigent circumstances to warrant their actions. 
They acted without addressing their minds to any 
particular risks identified in regard to the subject 
Residence. 
There were clear alternatives available to the 
police that did not involve a breach of the 
accused's rights under the Charter. As a 
consequence, there was an absence of good faith 
on the part of the police, not because the breach 
was deliberate, but because their actions were 
unreasonable. ...[I]t is inappropriate to condone 
the police failure to take the proper precautions 
to preserve the safety of all involved as well as 
the rights of the accused. Short cuts taken by the 
police that ignore constitutional rights should not 
be condoned .... [references omitted, paras. 37-40]
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
Note-able Quote
“Every man is guilty of all the good he didn't do.” - 
Voltaire (1694 - 1778) 
CURIOSITY SEARCH MISSES 
CONSTITUTIONAL MARK
R. v. Funk, 2008 BCSC 220
Shortly after 11:00 am several officers 
responded to a reported break and 
enter in progress with two suspects on 
scene. One of the responding officers 
slowly drove up the street looking into backyards for 
any suspicious activity when he observed a car in 
front of him make a u-turn.  This immediately aroused 
his suspicion and he thought that the vehicle was 
related to the break and enter. The officer was 
familiar with the area and thought that unless a 
person lived on the street or was visiting someone, 
there was no reason to be there. He pulled the vehicle 
over and approached the passenger side, opening the 
unlocked passenger door and speaking to its driver.  
The officer told the accused he was under 
investigation for break and enter, asked for his 
driver's licence, and Chartered and warned him.
The officer noticed that the vehicle was fairly clean 
inside and there was a medium sized black bag on the 
back seat with a lunch bag on top. The officer was 
curious to know what was inside the black bag given 
his experience that those kinds of bags are used to 
transport break and enter tools and other types of 
objects, including stolen items. He believed the 
accused could easily be involved with the reported 
break and enter and could be carrying tools, weapons, 
laptops or stolen jewellery. He was also surprised the 
accused was overly calm, cooperative and did not 
seem to understand what was happening, when most 
people are usually nervous when dealing with police 
officers. After the accused could only provide the 
first name of the vehicle's owner, did not know where 
the owner lived, and did not appear to fit the vehicle 
style, he informed the accused he was also being 
detained for theft of the vehicle. Computer checks 
for the registered owner and the accused were 
negative—neither had a record or any conditions. 
The officer, still suspicious and wanting to know what 
was in the black bag (to confirm there was nothing 
related to the break and enter, such as crowbars, 
razor blades, hammers, or bolt cutters—tools of the 
kind commonly used to break and enter), asked the 
accused if he could have a look inside, but the accused 
replied he would rather not have him look. The officer 
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then asked the accused to step out of the vehicle and 
noticed a silver pocketknife clipped on his jeans 
pocket. The officer took the knife, lifted the 
accused's shirt, and saw a black belt pouch labelled 
Gerber with another knife inside, which he also took. 
The accused was handcuffed, arrested for 
possession of a concealed weapon, and again 
Chartered and warned. The officer then went back to 
the vehicle, unzipped the black bag, and found a large 
quantity of drugs inside. The accused was arrested 
and re-Chartered for possession of a controlled 
substance for the purpose of trafficking.
At trial in British Columbia Supreme Court on 11 
counts of possessing controlled substances for the 
purposes of trafficking and two counts of carrying a 
concealed weapon, the accused argued his rights 
under ss.8 and 9 of the Charter were breached and 
that there were not reasonable grounds for his 
arrest for carrying a concealed weapon.
Justice Loo first noted that a warrantless search is 
prima facie unreasonable and in this case the Crown 
needed to prove that the arrest was reasonable and 
authorized by law under s.495 of the Criminal Code, 
which allows a peace officer to arrest without 
warrant a person who has committed an indictable 
offence or who, on reasonable grounds, he believes 
has committed or is about to commit an indictable 
offence.  If the arrest was reasonable, then a search 
incidental to the arrest would also be reasonable. 
The Search
The search in this case was incidental to neither an 
investigative detention nor arrest. 
A search incidental to investigative detention can be 
undertaken where the officer believes on reasonable 
grounds that their safety, or that of others, is at 
risk. It does not exist as a matter of course nor can 
it be justified on the basis of a vague or non-existent 
safety concern or be premised upon hunches or mere 
intuition. Here, Justice Loo found the officer could 
not have believed on reasonable grounds that his own 
safety or the safety of others was at risk when he 
searched the black bag:
[The accused] was handcuffed and in the back 
seat of a police vehicle.  [The officer] did not have 
objective reasonable grounds for believing there 
were weapons in the bag. He had received no 
reports that the reported break and enter was an 
actual break and enter, or that there were any 
weapons involved in the reported break and enter. 
[para. 38]
As for a search incidental to arrest, a search is only 
justifiable if the purpose of the search is related to 
the purpose of the arrest, such as finding evidence 
related to the arrest. In this case, the accused was 
arrested for carrying a concealed weapon and 
therefore there must have been some reasonable 
prospect of securing evidence on that charge when 
the black bag was searched. But that is not what the 
officer was looking for.  Rather, he wanted to satisfy 
his curiosity and know what was inside the bag and 
whether it was connected to the reported break and 
enter. Thus, the search was not truly incidental to 
the arrest or authorized by law.
The Arrest
The power to arrest requires that an arresting 
officer subjectively have reasonable grounds and 
that those grounds must be justifiable from an 
objective point of view, based on the totality of the 
circumstances. The police only need reasonable 
grounds and do not need to establish a prima facie
case for conviction before making the arrest. But in 
this case, Justice Loo found the knives were neither 
a weapon nor concealed. 
A weapon is defined in the Criminal Code as anything 
used, designed to be used, or intended for use in 
causing death or injury to any person, or for the 
purpose of threatening or intimidating any person. 
Justice Loo rejected Crown's submission that it could 
be reasonably inferred from the facts that the 
knives were intended to be used for self defence:
There is no evidence upon which I can properly 
make that leap. Otherwise, any citizen seen 
walking down the street with a similar pocket 
knife clipped to his pocket or while wearing a 
Gerber pouch carrying a Gerber knife in the way 
in which the knives were intended to be carried 
and worn could be arrested without warrant for 
carrying a concealed weapon.
[The officer] recognized the pocket knife 
because he has one like it. He can use it as a tool 
for example to cut a seat belt.  However, he 
testified in cross-examination that he was "not 
interested in finding out why" [the accused] had 
it. He simply saw it as a weapon. [paras. 51-52]
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Police recovered a wallet from the car that included 
the accused's British Columbia driver's licence, but 
did not find any drugs. A second search of the car 
located a hole cut in the floor of the vehicle under a 
flap of carpet.  The officer walked back along the 
road from where the Hyundai was stopped and where 
the emergency equipment was turned on. A small clear 
baggy with heroin and cocaine was found about 60 
metres behind the stopped vehicle.  
At trial in British Columbia Supreme Court on charges 
of possessing cocaine and heroin for the purpose of 
trafficking, the accused argued, among other 
grounds, that the police breached his s.8 
(unreasonable search) and s.9 (arbitrary detention) 
Charter rights. In his view, the police did not have 
reasonable grounds to detain and arrest him nor to 
search his vehicle. He submitted that his activities 
leading up to the pull over were consistent with 
innocuous or innocent purposes. The officers 
testified that in their experience, the behaviour they 
observed was consistent with a common form of drug 
distribution (a dial-a-dope operation). 
 
A search incidental to arrest will be valid if the 
arrest is lawful. A lawful arrest requires a subjective 
belief based on grounds justifiable from an objective 
point of view. In this case Justice McEwan found the 
arrest and resultant search lawful, stating: 
Here, although the second "encounter" required 
an inference, it was a logical and reasonable 
inference, and the police officers, despite their 
relative inexperience, possessed the skills and 
knowledge necessary to reasonably interpret the 
activities they observed as grounds for arresting 
the accused.
The arrest and search were predicated on 
subjectively reasonable and probable grounds, 
and on objectively justifiable circumstances.  The 
Charter was not violated under s. 8 or s. 9. [paras. 
18-19]
Justice McEwan was also satisfied that the accused 
was responsible for depositing the drugs on the road 
and he was convicted. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
Note-able Quote
“Justice without force is powerless; force without 
justice is tyrannical.” - Blaise Pascal 
Nor were the knives concealed—to be kept out of 
sight or notice. The pocketknife was clipped to a 
pocket and the Gerber knife was in a pouch attached 
to a belt, both as they were designed to be used. 
Justice Loo stated:
The officer did not have to search [the accused] 
in order to find the knives.  He saw the pocket 
knife when [the accuse] was getting out of the 
vehicle.  He saw the Gerber pouch around [the 
accused’s] belt when he lifted his shirt. In my 
view, the knives were not concealed. There is no 
evidence before me that the knives are weapons. 
[para. 49]
Thus, the officer did not have reasonable grounds to 
arrest for carrying a concealed weapon. 
Justice Loo concluded that the accused's Charter 
rights were breached and the evidence obtained from 
the search was excluded.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
REASONABLE INFERENCES 
SUPPORT GROUNDS FOR ARREST
R. v. Wan, 2008 BCSC 268
Two Crime Reduction Unit officers were on patrol in 
an unmarked unit when they observed a man who 
appeared to be waiting for someone at a 
street corner. He did not appear to be 
dressed for the inclement weather and 
was disheveled. A short time later they 
observed a Hyundai motor vehicle 
approach. The man got in the vehicle for about 30 
seconds and then both the man and the vehicle left in 
different directions. A few minutes later the 
officers observed the same vehicle and saw a man 
approach. They passed the vehicle and an officer saw 
what appeared to be a black bag in the driver's lap. 
When they got their vehicle turned around, the 
Hyundai had left the scene. The officers inferred 
there had been a second encounter.
The officers followed the Hyundai thinking another 
transaction might take place. They called for 
assistance from another police officer, who pulled 
the vehicle over. The accused, who was driving the 
Hyundai, was arrested for "drug trafficking" and he 
was transported back to the police detachment.
www.10-8.ca28
Volume 8 Issue 2
March/April 2008
FAILURE TO PROVIDE 
REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY  
BREACHES CHARTER
R. v. Smith, 2008 ONCA 127
Three masked men broke into a 
residence and began to assault the 
homeowner, who was able to flee the 
scene and call the police. In the 
meantime the perpetrators left the home in a vehicle 
and an officer tried to stop it, not knowing it was 
connected to the crime. After a short police chase, 
during which items taken from the home were thrown 
from the vehicle, the vehicle was stopped and the 
accused, along with his two companions, were 
detained. The accused was arrested for dangerous 
driving and the vehicle was searched at the scene in 
which a quantity of marijuana was found. As a result, 
the accused's companions were arrested for 
possession of drugs. 
The police soon connected the home invasion with the 
vehicle and the men were taken back to the police 
station, but, at that time, the accused was only under 
arrest for dangerous driving. Although guns were 
involved in the home invasion police did not find any. 
The accused had been informed of his right to 
counsel upon arrest and indicated a desire to speak to 
his lawyer on two occasions shortly thereafter. The 
accused became aggressive with the investigating 
officers and he was returned to his cell where he 
again asked to speak to his lawyer. He was told he 
would not be allowed to make any calls at that time. 
The police were concerned he might contact someone 
who would pick up the missing gun and for "officer 
safety", because he had become aggressive.
About five hours after the arrest the investigating 
officers decided to charge the accused in relation to 
the home invasion, but he was not told of this change 
in circumstances until several hours later. In the 
meantime, seven hours after the 
arrest, one of the accused's 
companions was questioned about 
the location of the firearm. He 
refused to tell the police 
anything and was returned to his 
cell where he spoke to the 
accused about the questioning 
and made incriminating remarks.  
While the accused's responses were somewhat 
equivocal, they could be interpreted as implicating 
him in the home invasion. This conversation was 
overheard by one of the investigating officers who 
took notes of it. The police again spoke to the 
accused and told him that he was being charged with 
robbery and firearms offences, but did not attempt 
to question him about the offences. Then, more than 
nine hours after his arrest, the accused was allowed 
to use the telephone.
At trial in the Ontario Court of Justice the judge 
admitted the statements made by the accused and 
his companion to each other in cells. In her view, the 
accused's rights under s.7 of the Charter were not 
breached. She found that the conversation in cells 
was not elicited by the police and rejected the notion 
that questioning the accused's companion and then 
returning him to cells was a ploy to try and get the 
men to talk about the robbery. The judge also noted 
that the men had both been told that areas of the 
police station were under surveillance. The accused 
was convicted of several offences including break 
enter and commit theft, masked with intent, and 
robbery while armed with firearm.
The accused appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal 
arguing, in part, that his rights under s.10(b) of the 
Charter were breached and the statements should be 
excluded on that basis. In holding the accused's right 
to counsel was violated, Justice Rosenberg, for the 
unanimous court, stated:
In my view, the [accused's] right to counsel as 
guaranteed by s. 10(b) of the Charter was 
infringed. [T]he Supreme Court of Canada held 
that s. 10(b) imposes at least two duties on the 
police in addition to the duty to inform the 
detainee of the right to counsel.  First, the police 
must provide the detainee with a reasonable 
opportunity to exercise the right to retain and 
instruct counsel without delay. On the trial 
judge's findings, the police did not carry out this 
duty. She rejected the 
explanation that it was 
reasonable to withhold access to 
counsel because of the ongoing 
investigation. Although that 
finding was made expressly in 
relation to the co-accused..., the 
[accused's] circumstances would 
not lead to a different result. 
[reference omitted, para. 17]
“s.10(b) imposes at least two duties 
on the police in addition to the duty to 
inform the detainee of the right to 
counsel. First, the police must 
provide the detainee with a 
reasonable opportunity to exercise 
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In so far as the accused also argued that the police 
failed to cease questioning or otherwise attempting 
to elicit evidence from him until he had a reasonable 
opportunity to retain and instruct counsel, Justice 
Rosenberg ruled there had been no elicitation. He 
stated:
The questioning of the co-accused ... was done in 
good faith by the police in an attempt to locate a 
dangerous weapon and was not a ploy. In those 
circumstances, although the police unquestionably 
hoped that [the co-accused] and the [accused] 
might talk, at least about the weapon, it cannot be 
said that the conduct of the police in placing the 
two suspects in adjoining cells and deciding to 
attempt to overhear the conversation was the 
functional equivalent of an interrogation. There 
was no special relationship between the police and 
[the co-accused] and the [accused]. Throughout, 
the [accused] and [his co-accused] had an accurate 
perception of the situation, knowing that they 
were having a conversation in a jail after being 
warned that they were under surveillance. ... [para. 
21] 
Thus, when police overheard the jail cell conversation 
they did not breach their duty to refrain from trying 
to elicit incriminating information from the accused 




By failing to provide a reasonable opportunity to 
contact counsel, the jail cell conversation was 
"obtained in a manner" that breached the accused's 
s.10(b) rights. The infringement or denial of the right 
preceded, or occurred in the course of, the obtaining 
of the evidence. It was not necessary to establish 
that the evidence would not have been obtained but 
for the violation of the Charter. Here, there was a 
very close temporal connection between the violation 
and the obtaining of the evidence. The violation of 
the  s.10(b) right was a continuing one, as the accused 
had repeatedly asserted his right to counsel. 
 
Trial fairness though, would not be affected by the 
admission of the evidence. The accused was not 
compelled or conscripted to incriminate himself. 
Police conduct was not a ploy, the accused was aware 
that he was under surveillance, he freely volunteered 
his remarks to someone he knew and who was not a 
police agent, and the police had not attempted to 
elicit evidence from the accused by questioning him 
prior to his conversation with his co-accused.
The breach, however, was serious. Although 
mitigated somewhat because the conversation took 
place in a cellblock where there was a reduced 
expectation of privacy and he volunteered these 
statements, the accused asserted his right to counsel 
repeatedly. The purpose of the right to counsel is to 
give the detainee an opportunity to obtain 
information as to how to exercise the right to silence 
and it was reasonable to assume that competent 
counsel would have advised the accused that he 
should not speak to other prisoners, even his 
companion. Justice Rosenberg also noted:
The violation of the [accused's] right to counsel 
was also not an isolated one. In addition to the s. 
10(b) violation, the police failed to comply with 
their duty under s. 10(a) to inform the [accused] 
promptly of the reasons for his detention. The 
police had decided to also charge the [accused] in 
relation to the home invasion by at least 9:05 a.m., 
but they did not inform the [accused] of the true 
nature of his jeopardy until 11:45 a.m., after his 
conversation with [his co-accused].  [para. 32]
Although the offences were serious, the Ontario 
Court of Appeal found the violation in this case 
"strikes at core values underlying the administration 
of justice: the right to advice from counsel within a 
reasonable time so as to exercise the right to silence 
with knowledge of one's real jeopardy." If the 
evidence were admitted, the administration of 
justice would be brought into greater disrepute than 
if were excluded. Accordingly, the appeal from 
conviction for the offences relating to the home 
invasion were set aside and a new trial was ordered. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Right to Silence
“Continued police questioning after the 
suspect has received legal advice does 
not offend s.7 of the Charter unless it is 
overbearing to the point where it overrides 
the suspect’s right to choose whether to 
answer or not or deprives him of an operating mind.” - 
Alberta Court of Appeal Justice Conrad, R. v. McKinnon, 
2007 ABCA 382 at para. 139, references omitted.
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HIGH STANDARD OF PROOF 
REJECTED FOR EVIDENCE OF 
HIGH RELIABILITY 
R. v. Colson, 2008 ONCA 21
The accused had been convicted of 
sexual assault, forcible confinement and 
assaulting police and served a four-year 
and five-month term of imprisonment in 
the Special Handling Unit of the Quebec 
Penitentiary. After his release he planned to move to 
Toronto to reside with relatives. Police contacted him 
prior to his release and met him at the bus terminal 
upon his arrival in Toronto where he was taken to 
police headquarters by detectives supervising high-
risk offenders upon their release from prison. He was 
interviewed and subsequently entered into a 
recognizance under s.810.2 of the Criminal Code with 
conditions that he attend for counselling, therapy or 
treatment as directed, and he enter into a program 
of regular polygraph examinations for the purpose of 
monitoring and managing his sexual behaviour. 
 
The accused complied with the conditions and 
developed a cordial relationship with the detectives 
over the following months. But he had failed the 
polygraph testing. The police then received a 
complaint from a woman that the accused sexually 
assaulted her. Although the detectives believed they 
did not have reasonable grounds to arrest him, they 
nonetheless interviewed the accused on videotape. 
During this lengthy interview the accused made 
statements and voluntarily provided a saliva sample.
 
About six months later a woman was murdered in an 
office building attached to the building where the 
other woman alleged she had been sexually assaulted 
by the accused.  DNA samples (semen) taken from the 
murder victim's body were found to be similar to the 
DNA sample taken from the saliva earlier provided by 
the accused. He was arrested and charged with first-
degree murder. A further blood sample pursuant to a 
Criminal Code DNA warrant was obtained while the 
accused was in custody and this sample matched as 
well.
 
At trial in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice a 
jury convicted the accused after the judge ruled the 
DNA evidence admissible. In the judge's view, the 
accused was well aware of the reasons for the 
request of his saliva and the potential uses for the 
sample and found he voluntarily consented to 
providing it. The accused had neither been physically 
or psychologically detained when he gave it. Nor was 
the relationship between the accused and the police 
based on oppression, fear or coercion, but rather was 
"one based upon cordiality and informality". The 
judge concluded the accused's rights were not 
infringed during the course of the interview and, 
applying the balance of probabilities standard, found 
he gave an informed, express and voluntary consent 
to the taking of the saliva sample. 
 
The accused appealed his conviction to the Ontario 
Court of Appeal arguing the saliva sample, and its 
results, was inadmissible under the common law. He 
submitted that the trial judge failed to apply the 
appropriate standard of proof in determining 
whether a proper waiver, in the form of a voluntary 
and informed consent, had been provided.  Rather 
than using a balance of probabilities standard for 
determining waiver (like consent seizures under the 
Charter), the accused contended that a voluntary and 
informed consent to the giving of a bodily sample 
should be treated no differently than a statement is 
under the common law confessions rule.  Under the 
common law confessions rule, the criminal standard of 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt applies. He 
suggested that since statements and body samples 
are both "conscriptive" forms of evidence and their 
admission when illegally obtained would tend to 
undermine the overarching principles of trial fairness 
and the right to protection against self-incrimination, 
the higher standard of proof is required.  
Justice Blair, writing the judgment for the unanimous 
court, rejected the accused's position. First, the 
common law with respect to the giving of bodily 
samples does not parallel the common law confessions 
rule in terms of the standard of proof. Second, there 
are significant differences between statements and 
body samples.  Reliability remains one of the essential 
underpinnings in the evidentiary exclusion / admission 
exercise under the common law confessions rule. And 
finally, there was no policy reason or justification for 
extending the common law rule to body samples in 
order to accommodate the process concerns that 
underlie the modern emphasis on trial fairness.
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Confessions rule
As well as trial fairness and protection against self-
incrimination, the common law confessions rule 
remains concerned with reliability as an underlying 
rationale because a confession made to a person in 
authority that is involuntary is often unreliable. Since 
it is recognized that involuntary statements are more 
likely to be unreliable, the confessions rule requires 
a standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
before it may be admitted in evidence to avoid 
miscarriages of justice. Unlike the making of a 
statement, which gives rise to serious "reliability" 
concerns, the taking of bodily samples gives rise to 
very few worries about "reliability", especially in the 
DNA context. "Reliability is not a concern with 
respect to bodily samples, particularly DNA results 
taken from a bodily sample of saliva," said Justice 
Blair. "Indeed, reliability is the hallmark of properly 
introduced DNA testing. Thus, there remains an 
important distinction between the admissibility of 
DNA results taken from a bodily saliva sample and a 
confession, notwithstanding that both are considered 
to be conscriptive evidence under s.24(2) of the 
Charter." He further stated:
Statements given to persons in authority are 
notoriously unreliable if their voluntariness, in the 
sense of their freedom from inducement or 
threat, is not assured. Different considerations 
arise with respect to the voluntariness of a waiver 
or consent to provide bodily samples, however, and 
with respect to the exclusion of test results 
emanating from those samples, which are not 
fraught with the same frailties. [para. 40]
Further the confessions rule has been confined to 
statements and has not been extended to the taking 
of bodily samples. Thus, Justice Blair found there 
was binding authority that "bodily samples and the 
results of physical tests are not to be treated in the 
same fashion as statements because the rationale 
behind the confessions rule only applies to 
statements."
Policy
Finally, the Court saw no policy reason or justification 
for extending the standard of proof under the 
common law confessions rule to the common law 
treatment of the taking of bodily samples because of 
the differing reliability concerns and the "well-
developed Charter landscape for determining 
whether improperly obtained evidence should or 
should not be excluded." Nor would the Court create 
a new common law right: 
  
At a more general level, however, I see no 
justification for creating a new common law right 
- infused, the argument goes, by the Charter tool 
of equating bodily samples and statements as 
"conscriptive evidence" and by the now Charter-
guaranteed fundamental principles of trial 
fairness and protection against self-incrimination 
- that would provide greater protection to an 
accused than the Charter safeguards he agrees 
have been properly applied in the circumstances 
of this case. The [accused] would derive greater 
protection because, under the proposed common 
law principle, the bodily samples would be 
automatically excluded from evidence unless the 
Crown could demonstrate a voluntary and 
informed waiver or consent beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Under the Charter, on the other hand, the 
[consent waiver doctrine] need only be 
established by the Crown on a balance of 
probabilities. In short, the [accused] invokes the 
Charter, and Charter-related values, to push the 
common law to the desired point, then invokes the 
common law (devoid of the Charter) to achieve 
the more advantageous legal result that he seeks.  
This approach makes no sense, particularly where 
... there is no need for it, given the well-developed 
Charter jurisprudence respecting trial fairness 
and its included values in the context of 
improperly obtained evidence. [para. 38]
Justice Blair ruled that the consent test, including 
the balance of probabilities standard, adequately 
addressed the core concerns of the criminal law.  He 
stated:
DNA samples, for example, do not bring with them 
the unease associated with potential wrongful 
convictions, whereas false confessions do and the 
common law confessions rule reflects that danger.  
[The Wills consent test] also directs trial judges 
to be alert to issues going to abuse of process and 
interference with individual autonomy (for 
example, police oppression, coercion or other 
external conduct negating freedom of choice).  On 
the other side of the scale, Wills balances the 
need of the state to investigate and solve crimes, 
a factor that speaks in favour of the less 
stringent standard of proof.
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...  The underlying criminal law policy concerns - 
wrongful convictions, abuse of police power and 
coerced self-incrimination, and respect for human 
choice and autonomy - are all adequately 
preserved and accommodated through the 
Charter regime.  A new common law regime is not 
required. [paras. 42-43]
The Court held that the trial judge applied the 
correct standard of proof in determining that the 
accused voluntarily consented to providing his saliva 
sample to the police. The sample and the DNA results 
flowing from it were admissible. The DNA results 
emanating from the second bodily sample provided 
pursuant to the Criminal Code DNA warrant were also 
properly admitted. The accused's appeal was 
dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
CHILD SEATBELT OFFENCE ONE 
OF STRICT LIABILITY
R. v. Kanda, 2008 ONCA 22
A traffic officer, parked at a four-way 
stop, saw a vehicle stop at the 
intersection.  There were three people 
in the vehicle - a male driver (the 
accused), a child in the front passenger seat, and 
another child in a rear seat sitting forward, leaning 
against the back of the driver's seat without a seat 
belt on. The vehicle was pulled over and a ticket for  
violating s.106(6) of Ontario's Highway Traffic Act
(HTA) was issued. This section creates an offence 
for a person to drive a motor vehicle on a highway in 
which there is a passenger under 16 years of age not 
wearing their seatbelt. 
At trial before a Justice of the Peace the accused 
testified he had ensured that both his sons were 
wearing their seat belts when they left the family 
home and that he was not aware until he was pulled 
over and was informed by the officer the boy in the 
back seat had unfastened his seat belt. The JP 
determined that s.106(6) was an absolute liability 
offence and therefore a due diligence defence was 
not available. The accused was convicted.
On appeal to the Ontario Court of Justice, the appeal 
judge concluded that s.106(6) was not an absolute 
liability offence but rather one of strict liability. As 
a result, the matter was referred back to the JP to 
determine whether the accused was entitled to 
advance a due diligence defence. The Crown then 
appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal to determine 
whether s.106(6) was a strict liability or an absolute 
liability offence.
Justice MacPherson, authoring the opinion of the 
Court, first outlined the three types of offences:
1. Mens rea (full liability) offences consist of some 
positive state of mind such as intent, knowledge, 
or recklessness which must be proven by the 
prosecution either as an inference from the 
nature of the act committed or by additional 
evidence. Offences which are criminal generally 
fall under this category. 
2. Strict liability offences do not require proof of 
mens rea—the doing of the prohibited act prima 
facie imports the offence. However, an accused 
may avoid liability by advancing a due diligence 
defence, proving that all reasonable care was 
taken to avoid the particular event in the 
circumstances, or the accused reasonably 
believed in a mistaken set of facts which, if 
true, would render the act or omission innocent. 
Public welfare offences presumptively fall into 
this category, unless words such as "wilfully", 
"with intent", "knowingly", or "intentionally" are 
contained in the statutory provision creating 
the offences thereby rendering them mens rea 
offences.
3. Absolute liability offences do not require proof 
of mens rea, but unlike a strict liability offence, 
it is not open to an accused to exonerate 
themselves by showing they were free of fault.
Section s.106(6) of the HTA is a public welfare 
offence making drivers responsible for ensuring that 
all passengers under 16 years of age use seat belts. 
It assures the safety of vulnerable youthful 
passengers who cannot be relied upon to take 
responsibility for their own safety. In deciding what 
category of offence a provision should be classified 
as, a court will consider four factors: the overall 
regulatory pattern, the subject matter, the penalty, 
and the precision of the language used. 
 
Although the overall regulatory pattern was neutral 
is assessing whether s.106(6) was an offence of 
strict liability and the penalty (a modest fine without 
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fear of imprisonment) was consistent with an absolute 
liability offence, the subject matter and precision of 
the language used supported a strict liability offence. 
With respect to the subject matter, Justice 
MacPherson stated:
In my view, the subject matter of s. 106(6) of the 
HTA supports a classification of the offence as 
strict liability. This classification strikes an 
appropriate balance between encouraging drivers 
to be vigilant about the safety of child passengers 
in their vehicles and not punishing those who 
exercise due diligence with respect to children's 
seat belts. [para. 32]
And further:
[T]he classification of strict liability strikes an 
appropriate balance between encouraging drivers 
to be vigilant about the safety of child passengers 
in their vehicles and not punishing those who 
exercise due diligence with respect to children's 
seat belts. [para. 44]
Regarding the language used, he found that even 
though the subsection used the triggering language 
"no person shall", it did not automatically make it one 
of absolute liability. Other provisions using such 
language and found to be absolute liability offences 
proscribed conduct resulting directly from the 
person's own action. Section 106(6), on the other 
hand, dealt with a situation in which another person 
(the child) was potentially involved in creating the 
violation. An accused should be able to raise a 
defence of due diligence or reasonable care for an 
offence of failing to meet a standard in respect of 
another person. Finally, s. 106(6) of the HTA does not 
expressly exclude the defence of due diligence. Thus, 
a person caught driving a car in Ontario containing a 
child who is not wearing a seat belt can raise a 
defence of due diligence. 
The appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
ARREST UNLAWFUL: OBJECTIVE 
GROUNDS MISSING
R. v. Fugman & Williamson, 2008 BCPC 70
 
An undercover police officer was given a 
telephone number of a possible dial-a-
dope operation, but was not told the 
source of this telephone number or of 
the belief of the person from whom she got it. She 
called the number and an unknown male answered. She 
provided a false name, tried to explain how she got 
the number, described what she looked like, said she 
had money, and agreed to meet in 10 minutes at a 
restaurant.  But there was no discussion about drugs.
  
The officer, dressed like a street level drug user, was 
dropped off in the area, but no one was there. About 
five minutes later a car drove into the lane nearby and 
stopped. When the passenger waved her over she 
walked to the passenger-side window, where the 
passenger was speaking on is cell-phone. He told the 
officer to, "Get in the back."  She refused several 
times to get in the car, despite his insistence, and 
asked, "Have you got the stuff?" During the 
conversation she noted a large quantity of cash on the 
console of the car. He said, "Get in and we'll talk 
about it."  It was then that the officer concluded the 
accuseds would not deal with her on the street so she 
signalled the cover team to move in.  Evidence was 
found and the accuseds were both charged with 
possessing cocaine and heroin for the purpose of 
trafficking.
 
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court the 
accuseds argued the police did not have the 
necessary grounds to arrest them. The officer 
testified she made the buy signal to arrest the men 
as dial-a-dope dealers because about 10 minutes had 
elapsed (which was consistent with the phone 
conversation and the sort of turnaround that often 
occurs in dial-a-dope cases). Furthermore, in the 
officer's experience there is often talk about where 
the person calling got the telephone number from, 
vehicles are often involved and show up, two people 
are involved 60 to 70 percent of the time, it is 
becoming more common for drug traffickers to ask 
the purchaser to get in, there was money on the 
console, and large quantities of cash are often 
associated with drug dealing.
An arrest will be lawful under s.495 of the Criminal 
Code if the police have reasonable grounds to make 
it. This imports both a subjective (what the officer 
believed) and objective (whether a reasonable person 
in the position of the officer would have the same 
belief) elements. Here, the officer said she had 
reasonable grounds to believe the accuseds would be 
in possession of drugs for the purpose of trafficking 
and were, therefore, about to commit trafficking. 
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The trial judge found the police officer had the 
necessary subjective grounds.
However, he ruled the objective grounds were lacking 
and the arrest was "precipitous". He noted the 
telephone number given to the officer was a 
"possible" dial-a-dope number, which means less than 
likely and even improbable. The telephone call 
mentioned no drugs, but only money. It was possibly a 
telephone call related to a dial-a-dope transaction, 
but could have been about some other legitimate 
transaction. Although the judge acknowledged that 
the whole tone of the call seemed to be rather 
sinister, he noted there were other possibilities, like 
the purchase of stolen property or an illegal money 
loan, and with the limited information in the call there 
was not enough to conclude that this was a dial-a-dope 
transaction. As well, the officer looked like a user and 
the type of person who may attract drug traffickers, 
but she also looked like a low-level prostitute, which 
could have been another reason for the men to 
approach her. 
Other than the 10-minute time frame matching what 
was discussed in the phone call (although it could have 
been a coincidence), there was nothing else linking the 
car to the phone call.  No one said anything, such as 
"You're on time" or "You're right where we told you 
to be" or "I'm sorry I'm late," no one confirmed or 
refuted the description that was given and discussed 
in the telephone call confirming that she was the 
right person or the fact that she might look 
different, and there was nothing else confirming the 
details about money nor any further discussion about 
it. The presence of the cash, although perhaps 
symptomatic of drug trafficking, could have been 
there for other illegal or legitimate reasons. As for 
the 60 to 70 percent statistic provided that dial-a-
dopers use two individuals in a car, it would also not 
be unusual to see two young men riding around in a car 
together not involved at all in any such transaction.
  
As a result, the trial judge concluded that the officer 
did not have the necessary objective grounds to 
justify an arrest under s.495. He did, however, note 
she had grounds to investigate further, or have 
others do that on her behalf, and perhaps an 
investigative detention of the two accused may have 
been justified, but not the arrest.
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca
TRAFFIC STOP A RUSE TO 
FURTHER DRUG INVESTIGATION: 
EVIDENCE EXCLUDED
R. v. Lauriente et al, 2008 BCSC 187
Police received a Crimestoppers tip 
about a five-acre property and launched 
an investigation. As part of the 
investigation the accused Lauriente was 
stopped a few days prior to the obtaining of the 
search warrant where a significant amount of 
information relevant to the investigation was 
gathered. The investigating officer asked a patrol 
officer to stop the accused for speeding, and while 
stopped, she surreptitiously took his photograph to 
be used for the surveillance portion of the 
investigation. As well, the patrol officer obtained a 
great deal of evidence which provided further 
information for obtaining the search warrant, such as 
where the accused lived and that he was the only 
person who drove the sport utility vehicle which had 
been observed at the property several times. 
The accused Lauriente was arrested in a vehicle as he 
left the residence while the officers were waiting 
for the search warrant to be granted. A search 
warrant under the Controlled Drugs and Substances 
Act was obtained and executed at a residence, two 
outbuildings, and three vehicles observed on the 
property. The accused Catalano was found amongst 
the plants in the larger outbuilding. Both men were 
charged with production of marihuana and possession 
for the purpose of trafficking. 
At trial in British Columbia Supreme Court the 
accused Lauriente argued the search and his arrest 
violated several of his Charter rights. Among those 
rights allegedly breached, he submitted, were two s.9 
breaches. First, he contended the police arbitrarily 
detained him when they pulled him over for the 
purpose of the traffic stop and second, that the 
police lacked reasonable grounds to arrest him. 
Furthermore, he maintained that his right under 
s.10(a) was also breached because he was not 
informed of the actual reason for the stop. 
The Traffic Stop
With respect to the vehicle stop, the investigating 
officer testified she "orchestrated" it because she 
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wished to further the drug investigation. She claimed 
she observed the accused going approximately 95 
km/h in a 70 km/h zone, but there was no evidence as 
to how she could reliably know that he was going 95 
km/h nor was a violation ticket written. In reviewing 
the evidence, Justice Koenigsberg found the 
circumstances of the stop took it outside a lawful 
dual-purpose stop. A permissible dual purpose traffic 
stop is one where the police have a legitimate traffic 
purpose for stopping a vehicle, while at the same time 
are pursuing a non-traffic related investigation (such 
as a drugs). As long as the traffic inquiries are 
legitimate the police can use the information from 
those enquiries to pursue the other non-traffic 
related investigation. In this regard, the Court stated:
Here, certainly, the lawful purpose of detention 
of an individual for speeding is at the very least 
on shaky ground.  The evidence of speeding in the 
mind of the constable who stopped [the accused] 
was not sufficiently solid to support issuing a 
ticket. Thus, the most reasonable inference is 
that the only real purpose for stopping [the 
accused] was to obtain evidence to further the 
investigation of a marihuana grow operation.  [The 
officer who pulled the accused over] did not stop 
[him] for a Motor Vehicle Act... violation to ensure 
public safety. He stopped him to provide 
information for an investigation.  ...
Here, there cannot reasonably be found to be a 
lawful purpose, that is a purpose related 
specifically to the Motor Vehicle Act concern for 
public safety, in the stopping of [the accused] for 
allegedly speeding when no ticket was even issued.  
In my view, this stop for speeding was a ruse for 
obtaining evidence to be used against [the 
accused].  It was therefore a clear breach of his 
s. 9 Charter rights. [references omitted, paras. 
39-40]
And further, in her s.24(2) analysis, Justice 
Koenigsberg had this to say about the stop:
The second [Charter breach found], is the 
stopping of [the accused] in order to obtain 
information for the investigation.  Again, I do not 
find bad faith in this particular instance.  I do not 
find that [the investigating officer] fabricated 
that [the accused] was speeding. There was simply 
no evidence of the reliability of her assertion that 
he was speeding and, further, he was not given a 
ticket. It is a relatively fine line between a dual 
purpose stop which is permissible, that is a stop in 
which there is a clear reason to detain an 
individual for an infraction of the law, and a ruse.  
Here I found on the totality of the circumstances 
before the Court that, in fact, the stop was a ruse 
and the detention of [the accused] was not for 
the purpose of public safety but, rather, to 
continue and assist in the investigation of the 
suspected grow operation. In these 
circumstances, in my view, this was a serious 
breach of [the accused'] s. 9 Charter rights. 
[para. 59]
Justice Koenigsberg also found the accused's s. 10(a) 
right was breached because at no time was he advised 
that the reason for the stop was for investigative 
purposes related to the possibility of a grow-op.  "It 
is no surprise that [the accused] was not advised of 
the reason for the stop, but that in no way takes away 
from the duty of a police officer to advise a person 
who is detained of the actual reason for the 
detainment," she said.  
The Arrest 
Justice Koenigsberg disagreed with the accused that 
the police did not have reasonable grounds to arrest 
him prior to applying for and obtaining the search 
warrant. He was observed leaving the residence a few 
hours before the search warrant was applied for and 
police anticipated they would obtain the warrant and 
would enter and search the property within hours.  
Before the accused was arrested the investigating 
officer knew the following:
 
• the Crimestoppers tip was almost completely 
confirmed and named the accused as the owner of 
the property, which was confirmed by 
investigation; 
• his car and person were observed at the 
residence and on the grounds of the residence, 
including around the out-buildings; 
• he had been seen in the residence; 
• he was the person named on the hydro billing for 
the residence; 
• the odour of growing marihuana was detected 
around one or more of the outbuildings including 
in the area where the accused had been observed; 
• and the hydro readings were considered high for 
the relevant period when the accused was the 
named person on the billing. 
All of these factors, in Justice Koenigsberg's view, 
gave the police reasonable grounds to arrest the 
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accused prior to obtaining the warrant. Thus the 
accused's warrantless arrest did not breach s.9.
Exclusion of Evidence
Having found a number of Charter breaches, including 
issues respecting the information to obtain the 
search warrant and breaches against the accused 
Catalano's rights, the Court held that the actions of 
the police demonstrated "evidence of the general lack 
of attention to fundamental Charter rights." Even 
though the grow operation was non-conscriptive 
evidence, the cumulative effect of the breaches was 
serious and the administration of justice would be 
brought into disrepute if it was admitted. Thus, the 
evidence was excluded and the accuseds were 
acquitted. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
LOSE FAT AND GET BIGGER
Insp. Kelly Keith, Atlantic Police Academy
One of the most common 
questions a personal trainer 
gets is “ How do I lose fat and 
get bigger?”
1) You have to lift heavy weights - light weights will 
not do the trick.
2) You need to stick to the basic exercises of 
squats, lunges, bench press, rows, pull-ups, 
military press, clean and jerk, and dead lifts.
3) You must change up your routine every 4 to 6 
weeks, keep your repetitions low (6-8 range) and 
your weight heavy.  
        
4) Your body needs water, and lots of it, to perform 
optimally.  Drink at least 10 to 12 glasses of water 
throughout the day and if you drink coffee,  drink 
an extra glass of water for every cup of coffee 
you drink.
5) You cannot achieve your goal unless you eat 
enough calories to grow.  There is no point in 
getting up and working out without first eating. If 
your goal is to simply lose weight this may be a 
good strategy. However, if you also want to get 
big, you must feed muscles for optimal 
performance.  Eating six meals per day (every 3 
hours) keeps your metabolism running optimally 
and will burn fat throughout the day.
6) If you are making a choice between low fat and 
low calories, always choose low calories. But keep 
in mind that you need to eat enough calories to 
sustain muscle growth.  Low fat may mean it is 
filled with sugar.  Generally, keep your food 
choices to the outside of the supermarket and try 
to stay away from processed food. Eating to get 
big and lose fat takes fresh food, costs a little 
more, and takes preparation.
7) An average person cannot lose more than 1 to 1 ½ 
pounds of fat per week without sacrificing lean 
muscle tissue or intra cellular water.  Ensure you 
have reasonable goals and reward yourself each 
time you achieve a short-term goal.
8) Your metabolism is the slowest in the evening. You 
need to eat, but this is when you want to increase 
protein consumption and watch your snacks.
9) Muscles build while we rest. If you do not get 
enough rest, you simply will not get big. 
About the Author - Insp. Kelly Keith is a 20 year 
veteran of law enforcement. He presently teaches 
Physical Training, Use of Force and Tactical Firearms 
to Corrections, Law and Security, Conservation 
Officers and Police Cadets at the Atlantic Police 
Academy. Kelly is a second degree black belt in Jiu-
Jitsu and a Certified Personal Trainer, Strength and 
Conditioning Instructor, and a Certified Sports 




“I conclude that police are not immune 
from liability under the Canadian law of 
negligence, that the police owe a duty of 
care in negligence to suspects being 
investigated, and that their conduct during 
the course of an investigation should be measured against 
the standard of how a reasonable officer in like 
circumstances would have acted....The law of negligence 
does not demand a perfect investigation. It requires only that 
police conducting an investigation act reasonably. When 
police fail to meet the standard of reasonableness, they may 
be accountable through negligence law for harm resulting to 
a suspect.” - Supreme Court of Canada Chief Justice 
McLachlin, Hill. v. Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police, 2007 
SCC 41 at para. 3 
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SPEAK AT YOUR OWN RISK
R. v. Meyers, 2008 NLCA 13
 
Police acquired warrants and obtained 
wiretap evidence as part of an extensive 
investigation, code named Operation 
Batman, regarding drug trafficking and 
the movement of marihuana from British Columbia to 
Newfoundland. Various members of the alleged drug 
conspiracy were identified. However, there was one 
person named Keith, who had not been identified from 
the wiretaps. The accused, who was in custody on 
another unrelated charge, was suspected of being 
“Keith”. The lead investigator in Operation Batman 
learned, by chance, the accused was in custody and 
spoke to him in cells to determine if his voice matched 
the voice of Keith on the wiretaps, which it did. 
Although the accused had been advised of his rights 
under s.10(b) of the Charter in respect to the charge 
for which he was detained, this advice was not 
repeated before the investigator spoke to him for 
voice identification purposes. 
The accused was granted bail on the charge against 
him, but when he returned to police headquarters 
eight days later to sign in as a condition of bail, he was 
arrested on a warrant for the trafficking charges. He 
was cautioned and advised of his right to a lawyer by 
the arresting officer and later was taken for 
administrative processing—the collection of personal 
data, fingerprinting and photography. Prior to 
processing, he was again cautioned and given his 
Charter rights.  He spoke to a lawyer, declined to give 
a statement, and again the Batman investigator was 
able to confirm he was the Keith on the intercepts by 
having another discussion with him, again comparing 
the voice he heard on a wiretap with the accused's 
voice.  
  
At trial in Newfoundland Supreme Court a voir dire
was held to determine whether the voice 
identification evidence should be excluded because of 
breaches to the accused's right to silence (s.7 
Charter) and right to counsel (s.10(b) Charter). The 
trial judge excluded the evidence of the discussion 
between the investigator and the accused when he 
was in the lockup on the unrelated charges because no 
s.10(b) Charter rights to a lawyer were given by the 
Batman investigator. However, the second 
conversation during the accused's processing was 
admissible. The investigator had cautioned the 
accused and given him his Charter rights to a lawyer, 
which he exercised. The accused was convicted by a 
jury of conspiracy to traffic and trafficking in 
marijuana. He was sentenced to eighteen months 
imprisonment followed by probation for three years.  
The accused then appealed to the Newfoundland 
Court of Appeal arguing, among other grounds, that 
the voice evidence ruled admissible by the trial judge 
should have been excluded and also that his arrest 
was invalid because of the Charter violations.  
s.7 Charter: Right to Silence
Section 7 of the Charter guarantees the right to 
silence and preserves the right of a detained 
individual to meaningfully choose whether to speak to 
the authorities or to remain silent. It also extends to 
exclude tricks which would effectively deprive the 
suspect of this choice. This principle is consistent 
with the common law right to silence which reflects 
the general principle that, absent statutory or other 
legal compulsion, no one is obligated to provide 
information to the police or respond to questioning.  
Section 7 does not, however, guarantee an absolute 
right to silence, but instead offers an objective 
approach subject to limits. These limits seek to 
achieve a balance between the right of the individual 
(choosing whether to speak to the authorities) and 
those of the state in effective law enforcement 
(society's interest in uncovering the truth in crime 
investigations). 
In this case, however, the inculpatory statement was 
not intended to be used as evidence for its content. 
The conversation could not be characterized as akin 
to an interrogation. In other words, what the accused 
said was irrelevant. Rather, the investigator was only 
interested in the sound of the accused's voice. The 
voice evidence was evidence of identification and 
admitted for that purpose. And the voice evidence 
fell within the least serious end of the identification 
evidence spectrum, which runs from penetration into 
or removal of a substance from the body (such as 
DNA sampling), through the taking of evidence which, 
while distasteful, is insubstantial, of short duration 
and leaves no lasting impression (such as 
fingerprinting), through probing into the individual's 
private life, to whether the evidence is generally 
available to the public (such as facial features). In 
holding that the voice evidence did not breach the 
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accused's right to silence, Justice Welsh, writing the 
majority opinion, stated:
Voice identification falls at the least serious end 
of the continuum. Though the participation of the 
individual is necessary, a person's voice is 
generally made available in a public way. Obtaining 
the evidence is non-intrusive in nature.  While the 
person has some control over who may hear his 
voice at a particular time, social intercourse by 
way of conversation is normal, and it would not be 
unusual for a stranger to hear the speaker's 
voice. Further, a distinction may properly be 
drawn between the use of a person's voice for 
purposes of identification and for the content of 
what is said. The latter engages issues related to 
inculpatory admissions by an accused, and is not 
relevant in this appeal.  [para. 24]
And further:
...  Given the nature of social intercourse which 
permits even strangers to hear an individual's 
voice, it is difficult to conclude that the person's 
dignity, integrity and autonomy are affected by 
listening to the person speak. This must be 
contrasted with the content of what is said which 
may, in fact, reveal intimate details of lifestyle 
and personal choices.
 
In summary, the fact that voice identification 
falls at the least serious end of the continuum 
affects the outcome in balancing the interests of 
the individual against those of the state in law 
enforcement. Obtaining the evidence is non-
intrusive in nature. The individual's dignity and 
integrity are unaffected.  The individual has a 
choice whether to speak. A voice does not, as 
such, generally engage a particular privacy 
interest since normal social intercourse makes 
the voice available even to strangers. Bearing 
these factors in mind, the right to silence has 
historically been concerned with content in the 
sense of confessions and inculpatory statements 
and admissions, not sound in the sense of 
identifying characteristics of speech. Finally, it is 
difficult to draw persuasive distinctions between 
auditory and visual identification of a person. In 
my view, the Charter guaranteed right to silence 
was not intended for this purpose. It seems to me 
that a person's face is as self-incriminatory as 
that person's voice. [paras. 26-27] 
          
s.10(b) Charter: Right to Counsel
Prior to the administrative arrest process, the 
accused was advised of his rights under s.10(b) of the 
Charter and had called a lawyer. The lawyer then had 
the responsibility to explain to the accused his rights 
and to advise him how to exercise them. There was no 
obligation on the police to forewarn the accused 
about voice identification. The standard police 
caution gives a choice; it not only informs there is no 
obligation to say anything in response to the charge, 
but also is given with an invitation to make a 
statement about the offence. In this case the 
accused had been given the right to counsel and had 
consulted a lawyer before any contact with the 
Batman investigator. The lawyer could have advised 
the accused of his right to remain silent and the 
danger that someone may listen to his voice for the 
purpose of making voice identification. The lawyer 
could have explained the wisdom of not speaking or, if 
he did not wish to have the sound of his voice 
available to be heard and observed by others, he had 
the choice of, for example, whispering or disguising 
his voice while providing succinct answers and 
avoiding engaging in conversation during processing. 
The failure of the police to give the accused the 
advice that was apparently not given by counsel does 
not infringe the right to silence or turn a 
conversation into a search.
The Arrest
The accused challenged the arrest warrant on the 
basis that the police did not have reasonable grounds 
sufficient to identify him as Keith, absent the 
conversation when he was being held in lockup on the 
unrelated charge. In his view, since the conversation 
was not admissible as evidence at the trial, it could 
not be relied upon for purposes of establishing 
grounds for the arrest, which lead to the 
administrative processing and the second 
conversation that flowed from that. Although the 
trial judge concluded the police violated s.10(b) and 
excluded the  conversation as evidence at trial, it 
could still be relied upon to form the reasonable 
grounds necessary to support the arrest, ruled 
Justice Welsh. He stated:
[The accused's argument] relies for its validity on 
a similar test being applied in determining 
whether evidence is admissible at trial and 
whether there was sufficient information to 
ground an arrest. In fact, the two situations 
engage different issues and criteria. 
 
To lay an information to obtain an arrest warrant, 
the officer must have reasonable grounds to 
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engaged in respect of those charges, though [the 
accused] had the common law right to refuse to 
speak with the officer. There is no basis on which 
to conclude that [the accused] did not voluntarily 
engage in conversation with [the investigator]. 
The fact that [the accused] was detained in the 
lockup on other charges does not alter these 
conclusions.  [paras. 39-45]
 
As a result, the first conversation (ruled inadmissible 
for trial) could be used for the reasonable grounds 
necessary to support the accused’s arrest.  
Another View
Justice Mercer, in dissent, would have ruled the 
second (post-arrest) conversation inadmissible. In his 
view, the first voice identification evidence was 
conscriptive and without it, the accused would not 
have been arrested eight days later. Thus, the voice 
identification evidence arising from the 
administrative processing would not exist.  
Therefore, it was conscriptive derivative evidence, 
which, in Justice Mercer's opinion, was not otherwise 
discoverable and therefore, as a general rule, would 
render the trial unfair. And conscriptive evidence 
rendering a trial unfair is presumptively inadmissible 
under s.24(2). In any event, the Charter violations 
were serious. Although the police did not threaten or 
induce the accused when they unobtrusively 
questioned him, there was no evidence that the first 
interview was motivated by circumstances of urgency 
or necessity. 
Further, the Supreme Court of Canada has 
established that the law requires police to re-inform 
an accused in custody of their s. 10(b) right to counsel 
before interviewing them as a suspect in an 
investigation other than the one that prompted the 
arrest or detention. The investigator was negligent 
for proceeding as he did, violating well-established 
law unsupported by a subjective belief, reasonably 
based, that it was consistent with the law. Finally, 
admission of the evidence would bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute. Although 
drug offences are considered serious offences, the 
disputed voice identification evidence was not 
essential to the Crown's case. Justice Mercer 
concluded "that the integrity of the criminal justice 
system is best served by exclusion of the disputed 
evidence."
The accused's appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
believe that the accused has committed an 
indictable offence (section 504 of the Criminal 
Code). At the investigatory stage, prior to arrest 
or detention, section 10(b), the right to counsel 
and to be informed thereof, is not engaged. 
 
Nonetheless, there is an established common law 
principle that an individual has the right to choose 
whether or not to speak with or respond to a 
police officer....
  
However, the police are not required to inform an 
individual of this right before engaging that 
person in conversation during a criminal 
investigation. The situation changes, and section 
10(b) of the Charter applies, if the officer 
detains, either physically or psychologically, or 
arrests the individual.  Prior to that time, the 
individual is free to refuse to converse with or 
respond to the officer. 
The same principles apply in the case on appeal. 
Based on the right to silence... [the accused] was 
under no compulsion to engage in conversation 
with [the investigator]. The fact that he was 
detained in the lockup on other unrelated charges 
does not alter this conclusion. There is no basis on 
which to conclude that the conversation with [the 
investiagtor] was akin to an interrogation, that 
[the accused] was obligated or vulnerable to the 
police officer, or that the nature of the 
conversation was manipulative in the sense of 
attempting to bring about a mental state in which 
[the accused] was more likely to make admissions. 
The officer was interested only in hearing [the 
accused] speak. The content of the conversation 
was irrelevant to the officer. 
    
Further, at the outset, [the investigator] told  
[the accused] he was a police officer. With this 
knowledge, [the accused] had the choice whether 
to speak to him or not. [The accused] had been 
advised of his rights under section 10(b) of the 
Charter, albeit for an unrelated charge. 
Presumably his counsel advised him that he could 
refuse to speak to the police.
In these circumstances, I am satisfied that, in 
order to determine whether [the accused] was 
the Keith Unknown in the wiretaps, it was open to 
the officer to engage [the accused] in 
conversation directed only to the question of 
identification without advising [the accused] that 
this was his purpose. This was a necessary 
preliminary step to establishing reasonable 
grounds on which to detain or arrest [the 
accused] on the charges of conspiracy and 
trafficking.  Section 10(b) of the Charter was not 
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COULD v. WILL: 
WHAT's THE DIFFERENCE?
R. v. Ford, 2008 BCCA 94
Police began an investigation, code 
named "Project Amazon", into the 
production of marihuana on a number of 
properties in an isolated community 
located on a lake accessible by a single road or by 
boat. It had a very small number of permanent 
residents, but during the summer months its 
population increased substantially. The accused was a 
registered co-owner of one of the suspected 
properties—a 4 ½ acre parcel located in a wooded area 
on a dead end road. 
A police officer sought and obtained several general 
warrants issued under s.487.01 of the Criminal Code
from a British Columbia Provincial Court judge. These 
warrants authorizied investigative steps to be taken 
with respect to the accused's property and 16 others. 
The information to obtain included information from 
police officers and other sources, including 
confidential informers. Police wanted to covertly 
enter onto the properties under investigation and do 
several things, including verifying the presence of 
controlled substances, conducting physical 
surveillance, taking samples, using thermal imaging, 
and using a global positioning system. The general 
warrant stated that there were reasonable grounds 
to believe offences contrary to the Controlled Drugs 
and Substances Act (CDSA) and the Criminal Code
have been, are or will be committed and that 
information, or evidence, that would assist the 
investigation of these offences could be obtained 
through a general warrant. 
Police officers acting under the general warrant 
entered onto the accused's property and discovered 
two wooden frame buildings side-by-side. The larger 
building had two vent holes near the roof and officers 
saw white light coming from under a wall at ground 
level. They determined the interior walls and floor 
were lined with clear plastic, there was a lower level 
beneath the clear plastic floor, and the white light 
was being emitted from beneath the plastic floor. 
The odour of growing marihuana was also detected 
and a diesel generator could be heard running in the 
smaller building. Digital photographs and video 
recordings of the buildings and the surrounding area 
were taken as well as the coordinates using a global 
positioning device.
About three months later a second general warrant 
was obtained. Again, this warrant indicated that 
there were reasonable grounds to believe that 
information or evidence that would assist the 
investigation of the suspected offences could be 
obtained by covert entry. The warrant also allowed 
police to verify the presence of controlled 
substances. Police officers entered onto the 
accused's property and detected a strong odour of 
growing marihuana near the residence on the 
property and heard a diesel engine running. Then, 
about three weeks later, a s. 11 CDSA warrant to 
search was granted. Police searched the accused's 
property and found a sophisticated marihuana grow 
operation in the residence and outbuildings.  Over 300 
marihuana plants were seized.
At trial in British Columbia Supreme Court the 
accused argued the two general warrants were 
facially invalid and breached s.8 of the Charter.  He 
submitted that the warrants contained the phrase 
"information, or evidence, that would assist in the 
investigation ... could be obtained through a General 
Warrant", rather than "will be obtained." The accused 
further contended that information about the 
marihuana grow operation gathered under the general 
warrants and later used to support the CDSA search 
warrant was also unreasonable and a s.8 breach. He 
suggested the evidence should have been excluded 
under s.24(2). 
The accused also argued that the provision in the 
general warrants permitting the police to enter onto 
his property to "verify the presence of [drugs]" was 
invalid because such investigative action cannot be 
authorized under s.487.01 when the police already 
have sufficient information to obtain a search 
warrant under either s.487 of the Criminal Code or 
s.11 of the CDSA. The trial judge rejected both of 
the accused's arguments and he was convicted of 
drug and weapons offences. The accused then 
appealed to the British Columbia Court of Appeal 
again arguing the searches were unreasonable.
Could v. Will
Justice Frankel, delivering the judgment of the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal, upheld the trial 
judge's ruling. Section 487.01 states that a judge 
"may issue a warrant ... authorizing a peace officer to 
... use any device or investigative technique or 
procedure or do any thing ... if the judge is satisfied 
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... that there are reasonable grounds to believe that 
an offence ... has been or will be committed and that 
information concerning the offence will be obtained 
through the use of the technique, procedure or 
device or the doing of the thing ... “. The accused 
submitted that the expression "could be found" was 
equivalent to "may be found", which only requires  the 
mere possibility of finding evidence, rather than the 
constitutionally required credibly based probability 
standard. 
After reviewing the dictionary definition of the 
words "could" and "will", Justice Frankel ruled that 
they "can both be used to express habitual action or 
probability: in other words, something greater than a 
mere possibility." And further he stated:
In the case at bar, I can come to no conclusion 
other than that the word "could" evinces that the 
issuing judges were satisfied there was a 
credibly-based probability or likelihood that the 
execution of the general warrants would assist in 
advancing the investigation. In the present 
context, "could be obtained" and "will be 
obtained" have similar meanings. Both general 
warrants are, therefore, facially valid. [para. 46]
He then went on to note that there are no pre-printed 
forms for general warrants in British Columbia, unlike 
s.487 of the Criminal Code or s.11 CDSA warrants. He 
suggested the person preparing general warrants 
should follow the practice of ensuring that recitals in 
a warrant track the language of the applicable 
statutes.
Verifying Drugs
The accused contended that 
s.487.01 did not permit a judge to 
authorize the police to enter onto 
property to "verify" the presence of 
drugs when they already had 
reasonable grounds to believe drugs 
were present. In order for them to 
obtain tangible evidence they should 
have obtained a s.487 warrant. The 
trial judge rejected this submission, 
holding the police are not limited 
when executing general warrants to 
obtaining information, which could 
not then become evidence. Instead he found s.487.01 
provides police with authority to gather that which at 
first might be just information but, in time, might 
become evidence. Justice Frankel again upheld the 
trial judge's ruling on this point:
I agree with the trial judge that there is nothing 
in the language of s. 487.01(1)(c) that precludes a 
peace officer from obtaining a general warrant 
solely because he or she has sufficient 
information to obtain a search warrant.  Resort to 
a general warrant is only precluded when judicial 
approval for the proposed "technique, procedure 
or device or the doing of the thing" is available 
under some other federal statutory provision.
That the police are in a position to obtain a search 
warrant does not prevent them from continuing to 
investigate using all other lawful means at their 
disposal.  Having regard to the requirements of s. 
487.01(1)(a), I expect that in many cases the 
information the police present in support of an 
application for a general warrant would also 
support an application for a search warrant.  I see 
nothing wrong in utilizing a general warrant to 
obtain information with a view to gathering 
additional and possibly better evidence than that 
which could be seized immediately through the 
execution of a search warrant. In addition, I 
expect there will be some cases in which 
investigative action taken under a general warrant 
will result in an investigation, or an aspect of it, 
being abandoned; e.g., where a covert entry 
reveals that a property does not contain a 
marihuana grow operation.
Although in April, 2004, the police had reasonable 
grounds to believe marihuana was being grown on 
the [accused's] property, the nature and scope of 
the investigation was such that it was not 
practicable for them to 
carry out a full search of the 
property until some months 
later.  In my view, their 
decision to seek to "verify" 
the presence of marihuana 
on the property during the 
course of their continuing 
investigation was a 
reasonable one. However..., 
covert entry onto the 
property for this purpose 
would constitute an 
unreasonable search in the 
absence of prior judicial 
approval.  As judicial 
approval for such an entry cannot be granted 
under s. 487 of the Code, s. 11 of the Controlled 
Drugs and Substances Act, or any other federal 
“That the police are in a position to 
obtain a search warrant does not 
prevent them from continuing to 
investigate using all other lawful means 
at their disposal. ...  I see nothing 
wrong in utilizing a general warrant to 
obtain information with a view to 
gathering additional and possibly better 
evidence than that which could be 
seized immediately through the 
execution of a search warrant.”
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statute, a general warrant under s. 487.01 was 
available.
This does not mean that it will be open to the 
police to obtain a general warrant in every case in 
which they have information to support the 
issuance of a search warrant.  Assuming the 
criteria in s. 487.01(1)(a) and (c) are met, the 
judge before whom an application is made still has 
to consider whether issuing a general warrant is 
"in the best interests of the administration of 
justice"... [references omitted, paras. 50-53]
The accused's appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
2006 B.C. COP STATS OUT
BC’s Ministry of Public Safety and 
Solicitor General recently revised its 
authorized police strength by jurisdiction 
statistics for 2006. 
SINGLE INCIDENT CAN FOUND 
CRIMINAL HARASSMENT 
CONVICTION
R. v. O’Connor, 2008 ONCA 206
A twelve year old boy became 
frightened while alone in the basement 
of his home when he noticed the 
accused tapping on the basement 
window. The boy’s mother (complainant) told the 
accused, at the front door of the home, that she did 
not want to speak to him. But the accused tried to 
break into the house. The complainant left the house 
with her son and the accused pursued. After catching 
up with her, the accused blocked her way by circling 
around her. When she tried to call 9-1-1 he grabbed 
the telephone from her hands and punched her in the 
arm. Then, when the complainant followed her son to 
a store, the accused followed after them. At the 
time, the accused was bound by a probation order 
requiring him to have no contact with the complainant. 
At trial in the Ontario Court of Justice, the accused 
was convicted of criminal harassment, assault, and 
breach of a probation order. The trial judge found 
the accused’s conduct caused the complainant to fear 
for her safety. He was sentenced to five years’ 
imprisonment for criminal harassment, three years’ 
imprisonment concurrent for assault, and one year of 
imprisonment consecutive for breach of probation, in 
addition to 414 days of pre-sentence custody. 
The accused appealed his conviction to the Ontario 
Court of Appeal arguing, in part, that the elements of 
criminal harassment were not proven since the charge 
arose from a single incident. He submitted that the 
evidence did not establish the necessary ongoing 
aspect of criminal harassment. 
Justice Simmons, delivering the judgment for the 
Court, disagreed. A “single incident of threatening 
conduct can found a conviction for criminal 
harassment if, in the circumstances, ‘the consequence 
is that the complainant is being harassed.’” Although 
“being in a harassed state involves a sense of being 
subject to ongoing torment, a single incident in the 
right context can surely cause this feeling”, such as 
“where the complainant’s feeling harassed would be 
proven [from] a single incident that carried the real 
2006 Police Jurisdictions over 100 Officers
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www.10-8.ca
43
Volume 8 Issue 2
March/April 2008
future prospect of the continuing tormenting of the 
complainant.” (references omitted)
In this case, Justice Simmons found “the complainant 
was harassed both because the [accused’s] behaviour 
during the incident was persistent and because the 
incident occurred while the [accused] was subject to 
a probation order requiring that he have no contact 
with the complainant.” Justice Simmons continued:
The finding that the complainant feared for her 
safety was available on the evidence, as was the 
trial judge’s implicit conclusion that the 
complainant’s fear was reasonable. In the light of 
this finding and the circumstances of the 
incident, in my opinion, the trial judge made no 
error in concluding that all of the elements of the 
offence were proven. Particularly given the 
[accused’s] persistence in the face of the 
probation order, the complainant’s fears would 
relate naturally to the prospect of ongoing 
torment, a fact that must have been obvious to 
the [accused]. [para. 9]
The accused’s sentence appeal, however, was allowed. 
Considering his pre-sentence custody, the accused 
received a total sentence of seven years and 49 days 
imprisonment for the three charges. Justice Simmons 
found this sentence to be both disproportionate to 
the conduct underlying the offences and outside the 
range of what was appropriate in the circumstances. 
Although the accused had a lengthy criminal record, 
including 47 convictions for crimes against the 
administration of justice (breaches of court orders 
and recognizances, failing to appear, obstructing 
justice, and driving while disqualified) and a prior 
conviction of criminal harassment, the Court 
substituted a sentence of 39 months imprisonment in 
addition to the 414 days of pre-sentence custody on 
the criminal harassment, along with 12 months 
imprisonment concurrent on the assault charge and 
twelve months imprisonment consecutive on the 
breach of probation charge. This amounted to a total 
effective sentence in excess of four and a half years 
imprisonment. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Note-able Quote
“Dream no small dreams for they have no power to 
move the hearts of men.” - Johann Wolfgang von 
Goethe
OBSERVATIONS MADE DURING 
TRAFFIC STOP ADMISSIBLE AS 
EVIDENCE OF IMPAIRMENT
R. v. Townsend, 2008 ABCA 44
 
A police officer on routine patrol at a 
local Tim Horton’s donut shop just after 
midnight was advised by a clerk that she 
had just served a customer at the 
drive-thru whom she thought might be impaired. The 
officer immediately left the restaurant and noticed 
only one vehicle in the area, which was leaving the 
parking lot. He followed the vehicle in his police car 
and saw it stop at a red light, but then proceed 
through the intersection prior to the light turning 
green. The vehicle made somewhat of an erratic 
unsignalled left turn into a hotel parking lot and 
parked in the middle of the driveway. The officer 
activated his emergency lights and approached the 
driver.  
Before the officer could speak, the accused asked 
why he had been stopped and was told it was because 
of the driving infractions the officer had observed. 
He was asked to produce his driver’s licence, 
registration, and insurance documents. The officer 
carefully observed the accused’s movements, 
watching for signs of impairment, and noted he 
appeared dazed, his eyes were blood-shot, there was 
a strong smell of alcohol on his breath, and his speech 
was slurred. As well, he saw the accused was having 
difficulty finding and producing his documents—his 
dexterity was very poor and very slow.
The officer concluded that the accused’s ability to 
drive was impaired by alcohol and he asked him to 
step out from his vehicle and accompany him to the 
police car, where he noted the accused was having 
difficulty with his balance during the short walk—his 
upper body swayed and he had difficulty standing up 
straight. The accused was arrested for impaired 
driving, told he would be charged with the two 
Alberta Traffic Safety Act (TSA) infractions and 
advised of his rights under s.10 of the Charter. He 
was transported to the police detachment where he 
contacted legal counsel and took a breathalyzer test, 
providing samples over the legal limit. He was charged 
with driving over 80mg%, impaired driving, and the 
traffic offences.
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At trial in Alberta Provincial Court the accused 
argued that the Crown could not rely on his 
statements to the police or evidence that he was 
having difficulty producing his documents because it 
was conscriptive evidence elicited from him before he 
was advised of his right to counsel. He submitted that 
evidence as to the manner of his speech, as well as 
the fumbling of the documents, should be excluded 
from consideration as to whether he was impaired. 
The trial judge disagreed, admitted the signs of 
impairment, and convicted the accused of impaired 
driving and also the two TSA offences.
The accused successfully appealed to the Alberta 
Court of Queen’s Bench. The appeal justice ruled the 
trial judge erred by relying on inadmissible compelled 
evidence (production of documents) obtained at the 
roadside. He found it was not a passive observation 
made by the police officer and, in the absence of not 
been given his Charter rights, was limited only to the 
reasonable and probable grounds in laying the charge. 
A new trial was ordered. 
The Crown then appealed to the Alberta Court of 
Appeal arguing the appeal justice erred in excluding 
the observations made by the officer. The Crown 
contended that that the rule restricting the use of 
evidence—like cases where compelled participation by 
drivers during roadside screening can only be used as 
an investigative tool to confirm or refute suspicion a 
driver might be impaired, not as direct evidence to 
incriminate them—does not apply in this case because 
the officer’s observations of impairment occurred 
while carrying out his authorized duties to enforce 
the TSA. In the Crown’s view, the evidence of 
impairment observed by the officer 
(the slurred speech and the poor 
delivery of documents) was 
admissible as proof of impairment, 
and not restricted to determining 
whether reasonable grounds existed. 
Justice Martin, delivering the 
opinion of the Court, agreed with 
Crown. Whether the limitation on 
roadside screening evidence applies to a case requires 
an analysis of the officer’s rationale for stopping the 
vehicle, the nature of the questions asked, and the 
purpose of those questions. In this case, there was no 
suggestion the accused was asked about alcohol 
consumption or to perform any sobriety test. The 
officer had received a complaint of a possible 
impaired driver, followed the vehicle, and observed 
two driving infractions. The officer approached the 
vehicle to investigate these infractions and 
requested the accused provide his licence, 
registration, and insurance particulars. Justice 
Martin noted that what transpired was in line with 
the officer’s duties under the TSA:
While the constable observed the [accused’s] 
speech and movements with a view to determining 
whether he was impaired, the entire interaction, 
at least until the time that the [accused] was 
asked to step from his vehicle and arrested, was 
in keeping with the issuance of tickets for Traffic 
Safety Act infractions. All drivers who have been 
observed committing infractions under the 
Traffic Safety Act are required by s. 167(1) to 
produce certain documents to enable the 
constable to issue tickets.
To exclude observations made in the course of 
this encounter because the constable also had in 
mind the possibility that the [accused] may have 
been impaired is unwarranted. The investigation 
of one offence may lead to the investigation of 
another. It is unrealistic to think that police 
officers who stop vehicles for traffic offences 
are not also alert to the possibility that the driver 
may be involved in other offences.
The limitation on the use of roadside screening 
evidence [in other cases] was intended to 
proportionally limit a driver’s right to counsel by 
providing police only with an investigative tool to 
confirm or reject an officer’s suspicion as to 
impairment. However, that restriction was not 
intended to apply to an officer’s observations 
made in the course of 
carrying out otherwise 
authorized duties. 
Moreover, unlike the 
evidence obtained from 
sobriety or other roadside 
screening tests in those 
cases, the evidence here 
concerns the [accused’s] 
appearances while being 
dealt with for traffic 
offences. Such observations are admissible to 
prove impairment in the same way as is evidence 
of drunkenness observed before a suspect 
entered a vehicle and began driving. The evidence 
of his appearance (such as slurred speech) 
existed independently of anything the officer did 
“The investigation of one offence 
may lead to the investigation of 
another. It is unrealistic to think that 
police officers who stop vehicles for 
traffic offences are not also alert to 
the possibility that the driver may be 
involved in other offences.”
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or said and would not change, whether or not the 
[accused] was advised of his right to counsel, or 
even immediately after he had contacted counsel. 
[paras. 18-20]
As a result, the Court concluded that an officer 
making observations of a driver, such as detecting 
signs of impairment like slurred speech or other 
similar signs, while carrying out other authorized 
duties would be admissible at trial to prove 
impairment.
The Crown’s appeal was allowed, evidence of the 
accused’s speech and his poor performance in 
producing documents was admissible as proof of his 
impairment. His conviction was restored.
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
BY THE BOOK:
s.167(1) of Alberta’s Traffic Safety Act:
On the request of a peace officer, a person 
driving or otherwise having the care or 
control of a motor vehicle or trailer shall 
produce to the peace officer for inspection 
the following documents as requested by 
the peace officer:
(a) the person’s subsisting operator’s licence;
(b) the subsisting certificate of registration issued in respect 
of the motor vehicle and any trailer attached to the motor 
vehicle;
(c) the subsisting financial responsibility card issued in 
respect of that motor vehicle;
(d) the customs permit issued in respect of the motor vehicle 
where a customs permit has been obtained in respect of 
the motor vehicle’s entry into Canada.
‘IN SERVICE’ 
LEGAL ROAD TEST ANSWERS
1. (a) True—see R. v. Borkowsky (at p. 11 of this 
publication). 
2. (a) True—see R. v. Mallery (at p. 14 of this 
publication). 
3. (a) True—see R. v. Nguyen (at p. 7 of this 
publication). 
4. (b) False—see R. v. Abel & Corbett (at p. 9 of this 
publication). 
5. (b) False—see R. v. Colson (at p. 30 of this 
publication). The waiver standard is on the 
balance of probabilities, not proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.
6. (a) True—see R. v. O’Connor (at p.  42 of this 
publication)  
7. (a) True—see R. v. Townsend (at p.  43 of this 
publication)
DID YOU KNOW...
...that in North Carolina it is illegal to 
hold more than two sessions of bingo per 
week and those sessions may not exceed 
five hours.
§ 14-309.8.  Limit on sessions.
The number of sessions of bingo conducted or sponsored 
by an exempt organization shall be limited to two 
sessions per week and such sessions must not exceed a 
period of five hours each per session. No two sessions of 
bingo shall be held within a 48-hour period of time. No 
more than two sessions of bingo shall be operated or 
conducted in any one building, hall or structure during any 
one calendar week and if two sessions are held, they must 
be held by the same exempt organization. This section 
shall not apply to bingo games conducted at a fair or 
other exhibition conducted pursuant to Article 45 of 
Chapter 106 of the General Statutes.
*** *** ***
...that federal law in the United States makes it 
illegal to issue a false weather report.
18 USC Section 2074. False weather reports.
Whoever knowingly issues or publishes any counterfeit 
weather forecast or warning of weather conditions 
falsely representing such    forecast or warning to have 
been issued or published by the Weather  Bureau, United 
States Signal Service, or other branch of the    
Government service, shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned  not more than ninety days, or both.
*** *** ***
...that in New Orleans it is against the law to curse a 
firefighter while they are in the performance of 
their duties.
Sec. 74-2. Cursing, etc., firefighters prohibited.
It shall be unlawful and a breach of the peace for any 
person wantonly to curse or revile or to use obscene or 
opprobrious language toward or with reference to any 
member of the city fire department while in the actual 
performance of his duty.
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NO OBLIGATION TO CEASE 
QUESTIONING WHEN DETAINEE 
ASKS TO SPEAK TO LAWYER 
AGAIN
R. v. Sinclair, 2008 BCCA 127
The accused was arrested on a Saturday 
by police for murder and advised that he 
had the right to retain and instruct 
counsel, that he could call any lawyer he 
wanted, and that if he could not afford a lawyer, a 
legal aid lawyer was available without charge. He was 
also told that if he wished to speak with a legal aid 
lawyer he would be given a telephone number to 
call.  The accused was transported to the police 
detachment and booked-in. He provided the name of 
the lawyer he wished to call. He was taken from his 
cell and placed in a room where he was allowed to 
speak to his lawyer over the phone in private, a call 
that lasted some three minutes. About three hours 
later the accused again spoke to his lawyer for 
another three minutes. After each call the accused 
was asked by an investigator whether he was 
satisfied with speaking to his lawyer, to which the 
accused replied he was. 
 
After the second call to a lawyer an undercover 
officer was placed in the same cell as the accused. 
Later that day he was taken from his cell and 
interviewed on audio and video tape. At the beginning 
of the interview, the officer confirmed with the 
accused that he had been advised of, and had 
exercised, his right to counsel.  The officer also 
confirmed that the interview was being recorded and 
could be used in court.  After answering a few 
questions as to where he had grown up, the accused 
told the officer that he didn’t have anything to say 
until his lawyer was around to tell him what was going 
on. The officer told the accused that it was his 
decision whether to say anything, 
but that he was not entitled to 
have his lawyer present during 
the interview. The accused then 
indicated that he wanted to hear 
what the officer had to say.
The officer questioned the 
accused further about his 
background. He answered a few 
questions, then said he wasn’t feeling comfortable not 
having his lawyer around and that he should be 
present while questioning was taking place. The 
officer said he could only tell the accused his rights 
and that it was for the accused to decide whether to 
talk to the police.  The officer explained that the 
police are required to advise persons who have been 
arrested of their right to counsel, that he had twice 
spoken with his lawyer, and that he had indicated he 
was satisfied with having done so. The officer then 
told the accused he was not entitled to have his 
lawyer present during the interview and he needed to 
decide whether to answer the questions. The 
interview lasted for about 4½ hours and as it 
progressed the officer revealed more and more 
evidence the police had gathered, referring to it as 
“overwhelming”.  The officer suggested the accused 
might have an explanation for what had happened, 
such as alcohol or rage as well as suggesting the 
victim may not have been without fault.
The officer confronted the accused about finding a 
number of the victim’s blood stains on the floor of a 
motel room. He said he would rather talk to his lawyer 
about it first and didn’t want to say anything at the 
moment. The officer then disclosed the existence of 
two witnesses who had seen the accused trying to 
clean the blood stains in the motel room, played a 
portion of a video-taped statement made by one of 
those witnesses, and then asked for an explanation of 
what had happened. The accused said he wanted to 
talk to his lawyer again and would do so on Monday 
when he would see him again. The officer left the 
interview room and returned, telling the accused the 
police had found the victim’s body and the bedding 
from the motel room, as well as the accused’s DNA on 
the bedding (which was not true).   The accused 
stated, “You got me I know it”, and told the officer 
what had happened the night of the victim’s death. He 
was returned to his cell and the undercover officer 
said, “That was a long time, it 
must be serious.”   The accused 
explained the events leading to 
the victim’s death and essentially 
repeated what he had told the 
interviewing officer. Later that 
same night, the accused 
accompanied the police to where 
the victim had been killed and 
took part in a re-enactment, 
“[The principle underlying the right to 
counsel found in s.10(b)] is to ensure 
that persons who are in the vulnerable 
position of just having been arrested 
or detained are informed of their right 
to obtain timely legal advice, 
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which was audio and video taped, 
and he again repeated what he 
had earlier told the police about 
what had happened.
At trial in British Columbia 
Supreme Court the accused’s 
statements to police were 
admitted. The justice ruled the 
police were not required to 
terminate the interview when 
the accused asked to speak with counsel again. In his 
view, the accused had been advised of his rights 
under s.10(b) and exercised them. The police were 
then entitled to continue the interview and were not 
obliged to stop nor allow the accused’s lawyer to be 
present during the investigation or interrogation. 
Rather, the police are not permitted to override or 
overbear an accused’s right to choose, such that an 
interview is so oppressive or overbearing that the 
person’s decision to talk is no longer voluntary. 
In this case the accused was aware that it was his 
choice whether to continue to speak to his 
interviewer. The justice concluded that although the 
accused “might have liked to have been able to talk to 
his lawyer, he understood what his choice was and the 
police were not obliged after he had been able to 
retain counsel to give him a further opportunity in 
this particular interview.”  The Crown had proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused’s 
statement was voluntary. As for 
the accused’s statement to the 
undercover officer, it was 
admissible because the 
undercover officer was not a 
person in authority and had not 
attempted to elicit any 
information or engage in 
discussions about the offence. 
The re-enactment was also 
admitted because the accused 
had participated in it voluntarily 
and the police were not required 
to “re-Charter or re-warn”.  The 
accused was convicted by a jury 
of manslaughter.
The accused appealed to the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal 
arguing the police were required 
to suspend further questioning 
when he requested another 
consultation with his lawyer and 
could not continue questioning 
him until he was provided a 
reasonable opportunity to do so. 
Justice Frankel, writing the 
decision of the Court, found the 
police are not under a duty to 
refrain from speaking with a 
detainee who has exercised their right to counsel 
merely because they want to talk to their lawyer 
again. 
The principle underlying the right to counsel found in 
s.10(b) “is to ensure that persons who are in the 
vulnerable position of just having been arrested or 
detained are informed of their right to obtain timely 
legal advice, particularly with respect to their right 
to remain silent.” As Justice Frankel noted:
…The right to counsel is intended to ensure that 
detainees receive immediate legal advice so that 
they will be able to make informed choices in their 
dealings with the police. … [O]nce a detainee has 
exercised his or her right to counsel, the police 
are entitled to use legitimate means to persuade 
him or her to speak.   I see no policy reason for 
providing a detainee, who does not have the right 
to terminate an interview by stating “I wish to 
remain silent”, the peremptory right to do so by 
stating, “I want to talk to my lawyer again.” 
[references omitted, para. 
40]
Under s.10(b) the police have 
the duties to (1)  inform the 
detainee of their right to 
retain and instruct counsel 
without delay and of the 
existence and availability of 
legal aid and duty counsel, (2) if 
a detainee indicates a desire to 
exercise this right, to provide 
them with a reasonable 
opportunity to exercise the 
right (except in urgent and 
dangerous circumstances),  and 
(3)  refrain from eliciting 
evidence from the detainee 
until they have had that 
reasonable opportunity (again, 
“[O]nce a detainee has exercised his or 
her right to counsel, the police are 
entitled to use legitimate means to 
persuade him or her to speak.  I see no 
policy reason for providing a detainee,  
the peremptory right to [terminate an 
interview] by stating, “I want to talk to 
my lawyer again.” 
“I fail to understand how the number of 
times a detainee asks to speak to 
counsel can make a difference when the 
police have already complied with 
s.10(b). If the police have no duty under 
s.10(b) to refrain from further 
questioning when such a request is 
made, then such a duty cannot arise 
simply because the request is 
repeated. To hold otherwise would 
create an unworkable situation for the 
police as it would be impossible for them 
to determine when to “hold off” in any 
particular case. The duty either exists, 
or it does not; there is no continuum.”
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except in cases of urgency or danger). After 
reviewing the case law Justice Frankel found “one 
constant theme:  s.10(b) does not require the police 
to hold off when a detainee who has exercised his or 
her right to counsel asks to speak with a lawyer again.”
Nor did the court accept the accused’s submission 
that there were special circumstances requiring the 
police to stop questioning him until he had again 
spoken to his lawyer.  Only having two three-minute 
phone conversations with his lawyer without an 
opportunity to meet him in person did not mean he did 
not have a meaningful 
discussion with his 
lawyer.  The accused bore 
the burden of proving, on a 
balance of probabilities, 
that his opportunity to 
consult counsel was 
inadequate. Neither he nor 
his lawyer testified on the voir dire, therefore the 
specifics of the advice are unknown. The trial judge 
found that the accused was well aware of his right to 
silence.  
The fact he did not make incriminating statements 
until after the last of his five requests to speak with 
his lawyer were made and ignored did not require the 
police to refrain from questioning him. The Court 
stated:
I fail to understand how the number of 
times a detainee asks to speak to counsel 
can make a difference when the police 
have already complied with s. 10(b). If the 
police have no duty under s. 10(b) to 
refrain from further questioning when 
such a request is made, then such a duty 
cannot arise simply because the request is 
repeated.  To hold otherwise would create an 
unworkable situation for the police as it would be 
impossible for them to determine when to “hold 
off” in any particular case. The duty either exists, 
or it does not; there is no continuum. [para. 65]
Justice Frankel also rejected the accused’s 
contention that he was entitled to speak with his 
lawyer again because, as the interview proceeded, his 
understanding of the case against him and, therefore, 
his jeopardy significantly changed when the 
interviewer revealed more and more about the 
evidence gathered by the police as their conversation 
continued:
The flaw in this argument is that there was no 
change in [the accused’s] jeopardy during the 
interview. He understood from the outset that he 
had been arrested for the murder of [the victim] 
and was, thereafter, in a position to make an 
informed decision as to whether to co-operate 
with the police in that investigation. The fact that 
[he] became more aware of the strength of the 
case against him over time did not amount to “a 
fundamental and discrete change in the purpose 
of the investigation” giving rise to a renewed right 
to obtain legal advice. [references omitted, para. 
67] 
Finally, the Court rejected the accused’s 
arguments that the police should have allowed him 
to speak with his lawyer again because his request 
to do so was not a “dilatory tactic”, there was no 
urgency to the investigation, and the police could 
have accommodated his request by suspending 
their interrogation until he had met with his 
lawyer on Monday (two days later). Even if true, this 
could not impose a constitutional duty on the police 
when none otherwise existed.  “The interests 
protected by s. 10(b) of the Charter are served when 
a detainee is afforded an opportunity to obtain legal 
advice on how to exercise his or her rights,” said 
Justice Frankel.  “Once the police have fulfilled their 
obligations to a suspect under s. 10((b), they are 
entitled to ‘attempt to tap this valuable source’”.   
The Court found there was no 
obligation on the police to stop 
questioning the accused when 
he asked to speak with his 
lawyer again.   His appeal was 
dismissed.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Reasonable Grounds
“[T]he standard of proof is one of 
reasonable probability, a standard more 
than a flimsy suspicion, but less than the 
civil test of balance of probabilities and 
much lower than proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.” - British Columbia 
Supreme Court Justice Blair, R. v. Brand & Ford, 2006 BCSC 
305 para. 39, affd 2008 BCCA 94 
“Once the police have 
fulfilled their obligations to a 
suspect under s.10((b), they 
are entitled to ‘attempt to tap 
this valuable source’”. 
“s.10(b) does not require the 
police to hold off when a 
detainee who has exercised his 
or her right to counsel asks to 
speak with a lawyer again.”
